Without lapsing too readily into clichés, when Israel and Iran avoided further escalating April’s tit-for-tat stand-off, the world breathed a sigh of relief. The Gaza conflict has hurled Kerosene onto the simmering conflict between the pair. Jerusalem’s proficiency in assassinating senior Iranians is matched by Tehran’s continued support for Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis.
Yet that reprieve may only be brief. Is there a whiff of Sarajevo, 1914 about the crash deaths of Iran’s president and foreign minister? Israel is not to blame for the deaths of Ebrahim Raisi and Hossein Amir-Abdollahian. Not only has it denied responsibility, but such an attack would be an absurd act of provocation. It bears little resemblance to Jerusalem’s carefully calibrated strikes.
The evidence suggests it was due to an unfortunate pairing of poor weather and mountainous terrain. The word “unfortunate” comes heavily caveated when referring to Raisi, nicknamed the “Butcher of Tehran” and the “Ayatollah of Massacre” for killing thousands of political prisoners. He also oversaw the killing of hundreds in response to the ‘Women, Life, Freedom’ protests.
Nonetheless, I summon up the spectre of the unfortunate Archduke if only because it did not require Gavrilo Princip to be employed by Serbia for Austria-Hungary and Germany to use Franz Ferdinand’s assassination to plunge the world into war. The Middle East in 2024 is as primed as Europe in 1914 – especially as Iran’s new crisis comes just as Israel faces a leadership dilemma of her own.
Iran’s constitution requires early elections within 50 days of the death of a president. In the interim, Mohammed Mokhber, Raisi’s deputy, will oversee the arrangement of a vote. Any long-term successor will require the imprimatur of Iran’s Supreme Leader: AIi Khamenei, the Ayatollah. Raisi won in 2021 amidst the widespread disqualification of rival candidates and a record-low turnout.
The consensus is that Raisi was being prepared as Khamenei’s successor. The Ayatollah is 85. Raisi was seen as a loyalist and hardliner, happy in his position as Khamenei’s spokesperson, and likely not to upset the almighty Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) after his accession. He faithfully carried out the Ayatollah’s agenda of brutal repression at home and confrontation abroad.
His death is inconvenient, to say the least. It increases the chance of Mojtaba, Khamenei’s son, succeeding his father – an embarrassing spectacle for a revolutionary theocracy founded by toppling a hereditary monarchy. But an election is also a headache for the regime amdist intractable 70 per cent inflation, high unemployment, persistent protests, and Western sanctions.
Even so, until the improbable day upon which the IRGC down their arms and Tehran renounces its ambition of leading a global Islamic revolution, the identity of the long-term successors of the Ayatollah is likely to change little of Iran’s agenda. The regime will perpetuate its unpopular rule, pursue hegemony over the Muslim world, and challenge a West it sees as decadent and divided.
It will continue to deepen its ties with Russia and China – drones to the former, oil to the latter. Despite the best hopes of Barack Obama and Joe Biden, Iran will not be lured by a mixture of carrots and sticks into acting as an ordinary member of America’s international order. It will continue to pursue its ambitions as part of an anti-Western axis stretching from Ukraine to Taiwan.
This returns us to Israel. As much as Tehran enjoys tweaking the nose of the Great Satan, its approach since October 7th has been calibrated to allow it to support its regional allies whilst preventing itself from being drawn into a direct – and unwinnable – war with Jerusalem and Washington. Yet support for Hamas – across the Shia-Sunni divide – is crucial to its claim to lead global Islam.
Israel’s strike on Iran’s embassy in Syria last month threatened to scupper this balance. By killing the most senior IRGC official since America’s assassination of Qasem Soleimani, Iran faced a provocation it could not ignore – another potential Sarajevo moment – and launched a direct attack on Israel for the first time. It included over 300 missiles and drones – the largest drone attack in history.
Jerusalem’s response of causing some light damage to an Iranian airbase seems underwhelming by comparison. It is rather less so when one remembers that Iran’s attack was shot down so effectively that it resulted in the wounding of just one Israeli – a seven-year-old Bedouin girl – and caused only trivial damage and demonstrated just how hostile many of its near neighbours are to it.
Moreover, Israel managed to strike – potentially from inside Iran, a significant security breach – a target next to the Islamic Republic’s Uranium Hexafluoride plant. This is not only the country’s primary nuclear installation, but rather perplexingly situated at the centre of a well-population city. It showed to the Ayatollah the devastation Jerusalem could wreak on his country if it chose.
As such, whilst last month’s stand-off broke new ground in Israel and Iran’s rivalry, it was calibrated to enable a face-saving score draw. Yet it persuaded neither Israel to deter from its war in Gaza, nor Iran to hesitate in its support for its regional proxies. It has set a heightened precedent for future clashes between the pair whilst not permanently deterring conflict. The stakes are raised.
This shines a light upon Benjamin Netanyahu’s ongoing public face-off with Benny Gantz and Yoav Gallant, the two other thirds of his three-man war cabinet. Both are former generals; the latter currently serves as Minister of Defence. The source of their dispute is the vexed question of how to approach the Gaza war and how the territory should be run after the elimination of Hamas.
Both are concerned by Netanyahu’s lack of clarity on Gaza’s future government. His unwillingness to allow Fatah, the Palestinian party governing the West Bank, to extend their role raises the prospect of a prolonged Israeli military occupation. This would not only require the costly governance of a hostile population, but it would reduce the ability to defend against Hezbollah in the north.
Yet Gantz’s demands – including Western troops in Gaza, a return for refugees fleeing Hezbollah to the Lebanese border, and the passing of a law that will force Orthodox Jews to do national service – are also unworkable. Passing it would force the withdrawal of two religious parties from Netanyahu’s coalition. But Gantz has threatened to pull out his party if his demands aren’t met.
Netanyahu’s government could survive Gantz’s departure but not the religious parties. It would leave him reliant on those elements of his coalition who have been pushing for a prolonged occupation of Gaza and an extension of Israel’s war. Bezalel Smotrich – his finance minister – has called for complete military control over Rafah and an invasion of Lebanon if Hezbollah does not retreat.
At a point at which Western support for her campaign is already fraying – not helped by yesterday’s judgement at the International Criminal Court – the direction of the war would be left reliant upon the most hardline elements of Israeli politics. Demographic trends point toward religious conservatives becoming more influential. Smotrich’s proposals are a sign of things to come.
This will put further strain on Israel’s relationship with Washington. Biden is increasingly isolated in standing by a war that his voters loathe. Yet America’s role in helping shoot down Iran’s bombardment last month shows how vital it remains to Israel’s security. How is this to be squared as Netanyahu’s government is pushed in an ever-more escalatory direction? And how will Iran respond?
War between Israel and Iran has only been delayed, not prevented. The Triple Entente and Central Powers made it through two decades of rivalry, the Agadir Crisis, and the Balkan Wars before Fortuna and train timetables did their work. Inexorably, Tel Aviv and Tehran are being drawn towards conflict. Two peoples cannot share one land; Iran cannot abandon its revolutionary mission.
What is Britain’s role in all this? Like in 1914, one assumes our alliances and sympathies will pull us in. Whether against Russia, China, or Iran, standing aside from the coming clash between the American order and its challengers would mean rejecting foreign policy orthodoxy for not-so-splendid isolation. We are hurtling towards a Third World War for which we are hideously unprepared.
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Author: William Atkinson
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