Marcus Solarz Hendriks is a Research Fellow at Policy Exchange.
Last Friday Ali Khamenei, the Iranian Supreme Leader, woke up to the news that Israel may have already delivered his 85th birthday present: in the early hours, several explosions rocked Isfahan province, home to nuclear storage and research facilities, an airbase, and a drone manufacturing site.
Although Jerusalem has not claimed responsibility, this appears to be its anticipated response to Iran’s unprecedented missile and drone salvo into Israeli territory on April 13. Iranian officials have played down the incident (blaming a limited drone strike, or denying it altogether) whilst missile casings found in Iraq indicate an air-launched attack.
As the commentariat busies itself with deciphering the details, it is prudent to zoom out to the wider regional picture. Events over the past three weeks have not taken place in a vacuum, but are leakage out of the Gazan conflict – which, in turn, is the latest eruption in Jerusalem’s longstanding showdown with Tehran and its regional proxies.
Viewed in context, this latest tit-for-tat is a sideshow of the main event. The right question to ask, therefore, is this: what new rules of the game have been established, and how do they alter the strategic calculations of both sides in the broader conflict?
Before April, Iran and Israel were locked in a decades-long shadow war. The approved rules of engagement (so to speak) were clear: military conflict was limited to Israel and Iran’s regional proxies (and their IRGC Quds Force commanders) and grey-zone warfare, such as cyberattacks and targeting trade vessels. That changed on April 13, when Iran struck Israeli territory for the first time.
On the face of it, Israel’s alleged response might seem muted. After all, Iran’s bombardment comprising over 300 missiles and drones was not only the first direct attack between the two countries, but the largest drone assault in history. In contrast, peppering an Iranian airbase with minimal damage would barely register as a nuisance, let alone a firm restoration of deterrence. Has Israel buckled under what military speak calls the ‘burden of escalation’?
The short answer is no. Assuming this was Jerusalem’s response, there is more than meets the eye.
Firstly, Israel has demonstrated that it can breach air defences around critical military and nuclear assets deep within Iran – something which, despite the scale of its attack, Tehran abjectly failed to do. Secondly, Iranian officials suggested that the drones were launched from inside the country, representing a serious internal security breach.
As senior Iranian officials have signalled that there will be no response, it seems the April cycle has concluded in a stalemate. This does not mean that the rules of engagement have not changed. Instead, two key questions must be asked of the lessons to be drawn from the episode: which side will feel encouraged by the escalation to territorial attacks? And what will be the impact on the Gazan conflict?
Beginning with Tehran, it is important to distinguish between the rhetoric and the strategic impetus behind its April 13 assault on Israel. Iranian officials were careful to ‘ringfence’ the attack on Israel as a specific response to the targeting of ‘Iranian soil’, namely its Syrian consulate (thus differentiating it from previous Israeli operations across Syria, Iraq and Lebanon).
However, Iran has haemorrhaged capabilities and personnel in these three states since October. This loss of strategic assets – and with them the capacity to project power near Israel’s border – most likely spurred the heightened response.
If Iran hoped to establish a new red line around its proxy command centres and facilities, it will be disappointed. Israel likely feels satisfied with how it controlled the April cycle.
Defensively, it neutralised 99 per cent of Iran’s missiles and drones whilst in air and – significantly – with the operational support of Western allies and Jordan, and perhaps intelligence from Saudi Arabia; offensively, it signalled its willingness and capability to reach critical assets deep in Iran. With this message delivered, it will be back to business as normal for now.
Returning to the Gazan conflict, key existing assumptions remain in place. Tehran has tried and failed to alter Jerusalem’s strategic calculus in Gaza by threatening to impose costs from afar. Israel’s calculations for the potential Rafah offensive will therefore principally be determined by how best to sequence its engagement with Iran’s proxies to fight successfully on multiple fronts. April’s battle may be over, but larger ones await.
The UK should therefore not be complacent about the success of crisis-averting diplomacy on this occasion. Absent a coherent regional strategy, we remain guided by the vain hope that isolated firefighting can prevent flashpoints – Gaza, Red Sea disruption, the Iran-Israel exchange – from spiralling into outright conflict.
Iran is the source of all these troubles, and requires a holistic approach (such as that recommended by Policy Exchange last year) to impose costs on its interlinked malign activities.
Tehran and Jerusalem’s venture into new confrontational terrain has for now ended in a stalemate, but larger conflict looms. As both sides have breached the old rule prohibiting direct attacks, yet emerged with their deterrence broadly intact, we cannot discount the prospect of a repeat of April’s regional pinball escalation.
Britain must engage with the Middle Eastern conflict as the interconnected struggle with Iran that it is. As Israel’s potential Rafah offensive nears, this means appreciating what is truly at stake – Israel’s security from the surrounding Iranian threat – and offering our ally the full political support it needs.
The post Marcus Hendriks: Israel and Iran have stepped back from the brink – but the game has changed in the Middle East appeared first on Conservative Home.
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Author: Marcus Hendriks
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