The Army must accelerate counterspace investments

The Secretary of Defense’s recent Army Transformation and Acquisition Reform memorandum contains a critical directive for the Army: to prioritize counterspace investments. This guidance represents a strategic recognition that modern military operations require seamless integration across multiple domains.

This isn’t just a nod to the importance of space, or a desire to claim territory. As the Army transforms, the counterspace reference signals a fundamental shift in how America’s Army must prepare for future battlefields. And despite some claims, it is not duplicative but rather vital that all the military services maintain and, in fact, grow their space capabilities.

Since the United States launched its first satellite in 1958, the Army has recognized the importance of the space domain. Today’s Army faces adversaries who view American reliance on space-based systems as a critical vulnerability to exploit. From Global Positioning System jamming to satellite communications disruption, adversaries are already employing counterspace capabilities against the joint force worldwide. This reality necessitates organic capabilities that can protect ground forces from space-enabled threats while maintaining operational effectiveness.

Building on this operational requirement, the Army space vision directs the service to integrate friendly space capabilities and interdict adversary space capabilities in support of ground force commanders. The requirement to interdict adversary space capabilities encompasses the Army’s counterspace mission, with specific emphasis on counter-satellite communications, counter-surveillance and reconnaissance, and navigation warfare operations. These counterspace activities require well-trained soldiers and civilians, properly organized and equipped with appropriate authorities and tools, to ensure United States land dominance.

Currently, forward-deployed Army multidomain task forces represent the operational manifestation of this concept, integrating space, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities to disintegrate enemy anti-access/area denial defenses. In 2028, forthcoming theater strike effects groups will complement the multidomain task forces as the Army’s premier space formation. Combined, these agile, scalable, and mobile Army space units, supported by flexible command structures, must maneuver with ground forces to protect them and ensure the Army can deploy and win decisively in contested environments.

Now, some may question why the Army should prioritize counterspace capabilities when the United States now has a dedicated Space Force. But the Army’s approach to counterspace differs fundamentally from the Space Force mission. Where the Space Force focuses on achieving space superiority across domains, Army counterspace capabilities are tailored to integrate with and support ground maneuver commanders. What distinguishes Army counterspace systems is their form factor: systems that are agile, scalable, expeditious, and co-located with ground maneuver forces.

Army counterspace capabilities are purpose-built to support ground maneuver units, which explains the Army’s focus on highly expeditionary counterspace formations and systems. A parallel can be drawn from the air domain regarding what differentiates the Air Force from other service air forces. Army aviation focuses on close air support to enable the land component and air mobility for intra-theater transport. Army aviation systems and formations cannot attain air superiority, nor is that their purpose. This distinction illustrates why the joint force needs both an Air Force and Army aviation, just as it needs both a Space Force and an Army with counterspace capabilities.

The expeditionary nature of these systems and their ability to scale across the Army represent key differentiators. Army counterspace programs are adopting smaller form factors to enable greater distribution. And thankfully, the Army is not alone in counterspace development. Each military service is developing counterspace capabilities tailored to its unique needs, similar to how each service develops counter-unmanned aerial system capabilities.

This service-specific approach aligns with broader patterns of military organization. The Space Force Chief of Space Operations provides additional clarity on space control and its higher purpose. In C-Note #34, Gen. Chance Saltzman highlights that space control “is the mission that drove the creation of a space service five years ago.” As the primary mission focused on protecting national interests in space, space control enables the Space Force to achieve space superiority through efforts spanning from temporary, reversible actions to more permanent, non-reversible effects, using both kinetic and non-kinetic methods to disrupt, degrade, or destroy targets.

Despite this logical division of responsibilities, counter-arguments persist. Following the Space Force establishment, there emerged a belief that all space personnel and capabilities should be consolidated within the Space Force; however, the caveat “as appropriate and authorized” is often overlooked. While this argument may sound logical, it runs counter to how military services organize, train, and equip forces. The joint force required decades to resolve close air support disputes, and many military practitioners would argue the debate persists as well. A similar counterspace debate will likely continue as senior defense leaders wrestle with service functions, roles, and responsibilities.

Interservice rivalry is the antithesis of meaningful progress. Instead, the joint force should embrace healthy competition, as seen in the early days of the United States’ space program.

The Way Forward

Modern warfare does not adhere to artificial domain boundaries. Every maneuver unit traverses multiple domains simultaneously: sea, air, land, and increasingly, space, as well as the information environment and cyberspace. All services operate from land-based installations and must be prepared to defend them against multidomain threats. The artificial separation of domains that characterizes legacy thinking has no place in modern warfare planning.

Given these realities, the joint force must normalize counterspace capabilities across all services rather than treating them as specialized, single-service responsibilities. This normalization requires several actions from defense leadership and Congress.

First, encourage the services to write counterspace requirements at the minimum classification level. In December 2023, the Department of Defense dramatically overhauled its space security classification guidance policy; however, the preponderance of counterspace capabilities have not been downgraded. The reduction in classification is one of the best methods to normalize space capabilities across the joint force. The Army is embracing the new space policy and is writing its counterspace requirements at the minimum classification levels, and encouraging fellow service to do the same.

Second, the Army must encourage common counterspace terminology and lexicon be codified in joint doctrine. While the Army space vision and Space Force C-Note #34 provide focus and direction for service specific counterspace capabilities, they do share common terminology. As counterspace capabilities lower classification, it becomes easier for the Joint Staff to codify in joint publication 3-14, joint space operations.

Third, defense leaders must recognize that the Space Force’s creation was focused on space superiority, not a space monopoly. Just as the Air Force’s establishment did not eliminate Army aviation, the Space Force’s existence does not dimmish the need for Army counterspace capabilities. Each service’s capabilities serve distinct operational requirements within their respective domains and missions. The Army’s development of expeditionary, mobile, and scalable counterspace capabilities will ensure that ground forces can protect themselves and enable movement and maneuver on multidomain battlefields.

Fourth, the Pentagon must accelerate funding for all service-specific counterspace programs. The Army’s mobile, expeditionary counterspace systems fill capability gaps that strategic-level systems cannot address. These investments represent essential force protection measures rather than duplicative efforts. Congress should support these programs as necessary components of comprehensive defense against space-enabled threats.

The Army’s counterspace investments represent a necessary evolution in military capabilities rather than parochial overreach. As adversaries deploy counterspace capabilities across their forces without regard for service boundaries, the United States must adopt a similar approach. The Army’s commitment to developing organic counterspace capabilities reflects the reality that ground commanders cannot wait for strategic-level responses when facing space-enabled threats at the forward edge of battle.

The multidomain battlefield necessitates innovative solutions. Army counterspace capabilities will complement rather than compete with Space Force systems, providing tactical-level protection that strategic systems cannot deliver to formations under fire. The joint force must embrace this level of multidomain integration to maintain competitive advantage against adversaries who do not constrain themselves with artificial domain limitations.

The Secretary of Defense’s directive to prioritize Army counterspace investments acknowledges this strategic necessity. Rather than questioning this guidance, defense leaders should accelerate its implementation while ensuring proper coordination between services. The Army’s counterspace initiative represents both an operational necessity and a strategic imperative for future military effectiveness.

Col. Pete Atkinson is a principal space adviser at Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Pentagon. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the official policy of the Department of Defense.