Why selling F-35s to Türkiye is smart business for the US and NATO

We wish to respond to the July 2 piece by Bradley Bowman and Sinan Ciddi here on Breaking Defense that Washington should not sell F-35s to Ankara irrespective of whether the Turkish side gives up its Russian-made S-400 air defense system.

With respect to the authors, Türkiye acquiring the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lighting II would be a great development for both NATO and the United States. This is our reply to that article under three headings — namely, Türkiye has never shared the secrets of any of its US-made weapons systems with third parties and it has no reason to do so with the Joint Strike Fighter; how and why Türkiye acquired the S-400; and why there is no real danger of the S-400 spying on F-35s over Turkish airspace.

Türkiye Betraying The F-35’s Secrets?

The concept that Türkiye would turn over the blueprints of the F-35 to Russia, Iran, China, or North Korea is one articulated by opponents of the deal, but it is unrealistic. While Türkiye trades with both Russia and Iran, it is also their geopolitical rival. Türkiye remains the only NATO ally to have shot down Russian aircraft using US-made AIM missiles in November 2015.

Ukraine is another example. Turkish-made Baykar TB2 drones performed admirably and helped brave Ukrainians to blunt the Russian onslaught in the critical opening rounds of Russia’s second invasion in 2022. Similarly, Türkiye did not follow the Obama administration’s lead in 2014-2015 and its never-ending “lethal vs. non-lethal aid” debate, instead moving quickly to support embattled Ukrainians facing a “hybrid” war from the Kremlin.

Seriously — why would Türkiye sell the secrets of a weapon it might use against its adversaries in the future? It never did so with the F-16 Fighting Falcon, the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates, the E-7 AWACS planes, or any other American-supplied platform.

The same point stands for China: Opinion polls reveal that Turks view Beijing with as great skepticism as they do the West and Moscow. Beijing’s excesses against Uyghurs, a fellow Turkic and Muslim group in Xinjiang (to which Turks refer to as “East Turkistan”), are often in the news.

As for Pyongyang, Ankara’s close ties with Seoul (including partnerships in various defense projects) makes sharing the F-35’s secrets with the Hermit Kingdom a laughable notion.

If the argument is that Türkiye has diplomatic and trade ties with Russia, Iran, and China, and should therefore not have F-35s, that would bar their sale to practically all US allies. Despite ongoing military, political and commercial tensions between the United States and China, their bilateral trade stood at $580 billion in 2024. Other NATO allies that operate the F-35, such as Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, also have close commercial ties with the People’s Republic.

Meanwhile, President Donald Trump offered to sell F-35s to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during the latter’s visit to Washington in February. India also has close diplomatic ties with Russia and Iran, yet no one claims that New Delhi — also the proud owner of at least five S-400 batteries — just might hold a private screening of the JSF for Moscow and Tehran.

Why Did Türkiye Even Acquire The S-400s?

Türkiye became a Tier III partner in the F-35 project in 2002, with about 10 Turkish firms producing around 900 critical components for the aircraft by the late 2010s. When Türkiye announced its intention to purchase S-400 air defense systems from Russia in 2017 and Russia delivered the goods two years later, the US Congress forced the Trump administration to place Ankara under CAATSA sanctions and removed it from the F-35 program.

Turkish acquisition of an advanced air defense system should not surprise anyone. Since the First Gulf War (1990-1991), Türkiye had signaled its intention to purchase high-altitude, long-range air defenses — either Patriots from the US or SAMP/T from Europe — but without much success or advantageous terms from its allies. Quite the contrary, during one of the most critical phases of the Syrian civil war in 2015, NATO allies such as the US, Germany and Netherlands withdrew their Patriot batteries from southern Türkiye, which increased Ankara’s sense of vulnerability.

Around the same time, China offered its HQ-9 (aka FD-2000) to Türkiye, promising joint production and other industrial offsets, although that deal never materialized. Then, Türkiye experienced a bloody coup attempt in July 2016, in which F-16s bombed critical locations. Unable to secure Patriot batteries quickly, Ankara turned to Moscow to meet its needs.

Although Russia did not offer offsets and joint production, it provided lucrative credit terms that did not place a major burden on the Turkish defense budget. And while Türkiye had envisaged purchasing several batteries of S-400s, events in Syria in 2020 and Ukraine in 2022 meant it acquired only one battery, which is inactive and sitting in a warehouse.

Recent events in Ukraine proved Ankara right — that at least some industrial offset to produce missiles and spare parts in other allied countries is a smart idea, given the limits of the Western defense industrial base. Luckily, NATO members committed to revving up their defense budgets at last month’s summit in The Hague. Türkiye’s innovative military-industrial complex can help allies fill their production gaps to catch up with Moscow and Beijing.

The S-400 Spy That Loves The F-35?

When it comes to the claim that the S-400 could be used to obtain the secrets of the F-35, we have some bad news for Bowman and Ciddi: This has already happened, and the United States, Israel, and several NATO allies are at fault — at least to the extent anyone could be faulted.

Russian S-400s in the Kaliningrad exclave have had many opportunities to observe Italy’s F-35Bs flying patrol missions over the Baltic for months. Meanwhile, Israel operated its F-35I ”Adir” over Syrian skies in the 2010s and early 2020s when Russia had S-400s in that theater.

To avoid revealing the F-35’s true stealth capabilities during peacetime operations without compromising its true radar cross section, the aircraft is integrated with “ ” and digital signature manipulation. No reason why Türkiye cannot employ similar means with its F-35s.

A related aspect in the Bowman-Ciddi piece was Türkiye resisting its allies’ calls to turn its S-400s over to Ukraine. Not only is that an affront to Turkish sovereignty, but it would also put Türkiye in violation of its agreement with Russia, possibly placing Ankara on Moscow’s crosshairs all the while complicating Turkish attempts in mediating a ceasefire in Ukraine in tandem with the United States.

At any rate, Türkiye has to its NATO allies that, if it would ever use the S-400, it would be in a “standalone” capacity without plugging into NATO’s air defense picture.

The good news for all involved parties is that Türkiye’s rapidly growing defense industries are solving the S-400 dilemma as we speak. Ankara has prioritized the development and building of Steel Dome, its multilayered, integrated air and missile defense system that is expected to become fully operational in the early 2030s. By the time Ankara has dozens of its indigenous Hisar and Siper medium- and long-range, high-altitude air and missile defense batteries, the Turkish-owned S-400 will probably join a museum.

Türkiye’s inclusion in the F-35 program serves NATO’s strategic interests. As one of the alliance’s most critical members geographically and militarily, a strong, interoperable Turkish Air Force enhances regional stability. Despite facing various sorts of embargoes and sanctions from its allies over decades, Türkiye has remained a committed member of NATO.

Every partner in the F-35 program knows Turkish companies deliver on time, on budget, and with precision. Reintegrating Türkiye into the JSF program would reduce overall costs, raise quality, and free up resources for other systems. That’s good business for the US and NATO.

Barın Kayaoğlu is the chair and assistant professor of American Studies at the Institute for Area Studies of the Social Sciences University of Ankara (ASBU) and an independent analyst and consultant. The opinions expressed in his articles are personal and not shared by ASBU or Barın’s clients, business partners, or relatives. On X (Twitter): @barinkayaoglu

Özgür Ekşi is a defense researcher and founder of the global defense news outlet TurDef. He has worked as a journalist since 1993, including roles at Hürriyet Daily and C4Defence. He holds international relations degrees from Istanbul University, SOAS London, and Paris-Saclay University. On X: @eksiozgur