You Don’t Realize How ‘Liberal’ You Are

Credit Image: © Vincent Isore/IP3 via ZUMA Press

Alain de Benoist, Against Liberalism: Society Is Not a Market, trans. F. Roger Devlin, Middle Europe Books, 312 pp., $30.00

Last December, a rift opened in the MAGA coalition over legal immigration. Elon Musk, a white South African turned US citizen, wrote on X: “If you want your TEAM to win the championship, you need to recruit top talent wherever they may be. That enables the whole TEAM to win.” Vivek Ramaswamy, a first-generation US citizen whose parents were born in India, agreed with Mr. Musk and defended companies that look outside the US for workers.

Mr. Ramaswamy even went so far as to suggest that American workers weren’t worth hiring: “A culture that celebrates the prom queen over the math olympiad champ, or the jock over the valedictorian, will not produce the best engineers.”

The MAGA victory of November was beginning to look like it might turn out to be the revenge of the nerds. But pushback was swift and decisive. Laura Loomer, Ann Coulter, and even Nikki Haley, among others, attacked the two “tech bros,” insisting that the US must prioritize hiring its own people. After all, what does “America First” mean if it does not mean “putting Americans first”?

In general, MAGA Republicans felt betrayed. In response, Mr. Musk backed away from the topic of legal immigration, while Mr. Ramaswamy was quietly removed from the Trump inner circle and may well have ruined his political future.

Alain de Benoist would consider the views of both men to be classic expressions of modern liberalism — though both would probably be very surprised to hear that. In Europe, “liberalism” usually refers to so-called “classical liberalism” which has given rise to center-right liberalism and center-left liberalism, sometimes called “social liberalism.” In the US, outside of academia, “liberalism” is now exclusively used to refer to social liberalism, and “liberal” is used to describe moderate leftists or Democrats.

Alain de Benoist’s Against Liberalism is most certainly against leftism, but the liberalism he refers to is a broader category that includes not just the philosophy of the Left but the views of so-called “conservatives” like Mr. Musk and Mr. Ramaswamy. Indeed, virtually all self-identified Republican politicians, pundits, and voters, as well as their equivalents in Britain, would be considered liberals by Mr. Benoist.

In simply identifying this fact we can anticipate one of the main themes from the book: For Mr. Benoist, the real problem with modern civilization is liberalism, whether espoused by Left or Right. The “liberals” and “conservatives” we take to be polar opposites are, in fact, united in some of their most fundamental principles.

Indeed, there are many even on the New Right who espouse classical liberal principles, oblivious to the fact that these have made possible many of the ills they decry: multiculturalism, welfare dependency, the atomization of society, the breakdown of the family, etc.

Mr. Benoist describes a liberal society as one “dominated by the primacy of the individual, the ideology of progress, the rights-of-man ideology, an obsession with growth, a disproportionate emphasis on mercantile values, the subjection of the symbolic imagination to the axioms of self-interest, and so on.”

Central to liberalism is the free market. Liberals tend to believe that individualism and the “rights of man” ideology are the foundation upon which the market economy rests. Mr. Benoist reverses this, insisting that the high-minded ideals of liberalism are founded upon the market.

He means that the market has a kind of primacy in the modern world: it has shaped our fundamental conceptions of human nature, of social relations, and of our relation to the natural world. Mr. Benoist writes that

Liberalism is firstly an economic doctrine that tends to make the self-regulating market the paradigm for all social facts. What is called political liberalism is merely a way of applying principles deduced from this economic doctrine to political life, principles that tend precisely to limit the role of politics as much as possible.

In a liberal society, social relations are based on the model of the market. When someone lacks a romantic partner and is looking for dates, he is “on the market.” Marriages are like corporate mergers, from which either party can withdraw at any time, should the merger prove no longer profitable.

Virtues are cultivated not because they are good in themselves but because they are good advertising. If, for example, a company is known to be philanthropic or “environmentally aware,” this is thought to be good because it is good for business. Honesty is practiced not because it is a duty but because it is “the best policy.”

A man’s reputation is now referred to as his “brand.” Education is thought of as a commodity, and is now assessed in terms of whether it makes possible a lucrative career. Academic disciplines are expected to produce “outcomes,” which are assessed in quantitative fashion and subjected to cost-benefit analysis.

Religion, or, as it gets called today, “spirituality,” is also a commodity. Sects compete to attract followers by promising salvation for the least amount of effort. And many sects preach some version of the “prosperity gospel”: have faith and pray and you will get richer; donate to charity or to the church, not because it is good, but because God will reward you with this-worldly abundance.

Countries are economic zones. Nations are, as Messrs. Musk and Ramaswamy have shown us, like business teams or sports teams. Their members can be swapped out for strangers from other economic zones, with supposedly have no effect on the nation.

This is the basis, needless to say, for multiculturalism. Mr. Benoist writes:

A million non-Europeans coming to settle in Europe is simply a million individuals coming to add themselves to other millions of individuals. The receiving nation, itself a mere aggregate of individuals, gets a certain supplementary number of economic agents. The liberal reasons as if people were interchangeable, which they are in fact, as long as we take only the economic and quantitative side of things into account.

As the “very liberal” French economist Bertrand Lemennicier has stated, “France is simply an aggregate of human beings.”

In liberal society, mercantile values insert themselves into every area of life, to the point that non-mercantile values are forgotten or eliminated. Goods are prized solely for their utility or their exchange value. The idea that there may be things that are good in themselves (as opposed to good for something else) is now inconceivable to many.

The critique of individualism

In addition to making the self-regulating market the model for all social facts, Mr. Benoist states that liberalism promotes “an anthropology of the individualist type, i.e., a conception of man as not a fundamentally social being.” In fact, individualism is the metaphysical foundation of the market model.

Americans tend to have a rosy view of “individualism,” a word they often utter in reverential tones. To Americans, it suggests such things as self-reliance and having an independent mind. These are positive values, but for Mr. Benoist individualism means something much more. He refers to it as an “anthropology”: It is, in fact, a theory of human nature.

Individualism is the theory that humans are, effectively, social atoms. These atoms enter into relations with others (employment, friendship, marriage, etc.) but the atoms are not defined through these relations. They are defined, instead, by their preferences, which pre-exist all relations. The atoms can exit relationships and enter new ones without any fundamental change to their nature.

Similarly, aggregates of atomic humans (sports teams, companies, cities, nations, etc.) can continue to exist, unaffected, even if the atoms that constitute them are swapped out for entirely different atoms. This is the metaphysics underlying the defense of legal immigration offered by Messrs. Musk and Ramaswamy. If existing Americans aren’t good enough, we will exchange them for new “Americans” and America will be unchanged.

The metaphysics of individualism is effectively Epicurean. Epicurus and his Roman follower Lucretius held that all that exists are atoms and the empty void. Atoms can be combined in various ways, but these combinations effect no change in the atoms themselves, which are also identical and hence interchangeable.

One feels something of the cold breath of the Epicurean void in the sheer inhumanity of the idea of importing a new people to replace one’s own; in the complete absence of any empathy for one’s fellow countrymen, who are regarded as replaceable machine parts.

One sees the same inhumanity, and the same metaphysics, in the suggestion that out-of-work coal miners “learn to code” — as if everyone can do anything. One might want to attribute such a position to our high-minded egalitarianism, which tells us that anyone can be anything so long as he puts his mind to it. But that egalitarianism is itself an expression of our atomic individualism: atoms are identical, thus all are “equal” and interchangeable. Every coal miner can be a coder and every coder a coal miner.

Modernity

It can easily be seen that in describing liberal society and its fundamental presuppositions, we are at the same time describing modernity. The rise of liberalism and the rise of modernity are the same history described in two different ways. And one could also describe that same history as the rise of individualism. Modernity is a Western phenomenon characterized by the rise of liberalism and all that this entails, including capitalism and individualism.

“Modern” derives from Latin modernus, from modo, meaning “recently” or “just now.” The modern age, in other words, is “what’s new.” The German word for “modernity” is die Neuzeit, meaning literally “the new age” or “new time.” In the new time, time itself is new and improved: it moves in a straight line stretched between darkness and the light of “progress.” Modernity’s self-understanding is that it is the age that has broken with the past.

This self-understanding is largely correct. Modernity is possible only because new forms of social relations arose that were a radical break with older forms. In the ancient and medieval worlds, individuals derived their identity primarily from belonging to groups, such as family, clan, town, guild, and church. The rise of modernity is a direct result of the gradual (and sometimes not-so-gradual) dissolution of these bonds.

The ancient and medieval view was that such bonds are prior to the individual (and thus more fundamental) because they make him what he is. The modern individualist view is that the individual is prior to social bonds. What constitutes him above all else is entirely his own and not a function of group membership: i.e., his autonomy, his freedom to choose and to pursue personal preferences. He can thus divest himself of any and all social relations and still remain exactly what he is.

The inevitable result of this is that modern liberalism tends to regard all unchosen social bonds — such as kin, the community one was born into, and the religion of one’s parents — as intolerable restrictions on individual freedom. Modernity can thus be understood, on one level, as the process by which individuals are divested of all the social bonds from which men in traditional society derived their sense of identity, and which gave meaning to their lives.

It is thus no accident that modern ideologies and modern trends seem always to have the effect of weakening the family, weakening ties to the community and to the land, and undermining religious belief. It is also no accident that modern people suffer acutely from the sense of not knowing who they are, and of having no real purpose in life.

The modern answer to this affliction is the Epicurean answer: pursue pleasure, though in the degenerate form of cupidity or acquisitiveness. For many modern people, their identity is constituted not through organic bonds but through what they buy and own.

The Christian origins of liberalism

How this revolution in social relations came about is a complex issue, and one cannot pin the blame on any one thing. This history is not the focus of Against Liberalism, but Mr. Benoist does discuss it at some length. He puts a great deal of the blame on Christianity.

If he is right, then this is surely one of the great ironies in history – that Christianity made possible social conditions that have led to a sharp decline not just in religiosity, but in solidarity, empathy, and charity. Mr. Benoist traces modern individualism to the Christian teaching about man’s nature, and the relation of man to God.

Christianity holds that man is an individual whose most fundamental relation is not to family or community or nation but to a being that transcends the world entirely. It is as a result of this relation that he can be saved. Indeed, all men have the potential to be saved because all have fundamentally the same relationship to God: all are equal in the sight of God. Mr. Benoist is not the first to claim that we see in this doctrine the germinal form of modern universalism and egalitarianism.

Since men are all equally sons of God, they belong to the same family. This family of the faithful supersedes any other familial relationship, including race or nation. Mr. Benoist quotes: “There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither man nor woman, for all of you are one in Christ Jesus.”

Just as in modern liberal individualism, for Christianity the individual is what he is prior to and independent of family, nation, race, and social role. These are inessential. The individual is not even fundamentally man or woman, as the Apostle makes clear. Only his relation to God is essential; all else that can be said of him is accidental.

We see here the seeds of the modern individualist claim that one can abjure all relations and identities, even “gender identity.” And we see the seeds of multiculturalism, which, amidst a great deal of rhetoric about “diversity,” actually agrees with Galatians that all men are really one, and thus can be thrown together in any combination.

The Catholic Church acted as a bulwark against this individualism through its insistence that man could achieve salvation only within the community of the church, and only through the guidance of a priestly intermediary between man and God.

Protestantism, however, took a radical step toward modern individualism by insisting that men could be saved only through a direct and personal relationship to God. Salvation depended upon the state of the individual soul, and not upon membership in any group, even the Church. Mr. Benoist quotes French historian and philosopher Marcel Gauchet saying that with Protestantism “the interiority with which [Christianity] began becomes a thoroughgoing religious individualism.”

In holding that only man’s relationship to God was of any ultimate value, Christianity inevitably diminished in value the world and worldly things. As Mr. Benoist notes, for modern liberalism and individualism to arise, the dualism between this world and the next world had to be eradicated. The “Protestant work ethic” significantly contributed to this, through its emphasis on this-worldly industriousness.

The Calvinist position that wealth is a sign of God’s favor virtually completed the process. It was difficult, at this point, not to draw the conclusion that this-worldly busy-ness was the ultimate value, and that the good worker or good businessman was a good Christian.

Gradually, the sense that men have a calling that transcends this world came to be lost, and with it much of the hold of Protestant Christianity on hearts and minds. Statistics on church attendance in Europe show a steady decline year by year since they first began to be recorded in the 18th century.

Christianity has continued to exist, of course, though with a severely attenuated theology. As noted earlier, it is now the “prosperity gospel” that is packing in the faithful (especially in so-called “mega-churches”), which amounts to a stripped down version of the Calvinist teaching that financial success is a sign of divine favor.

All that then remained was for the educated, urban classes to discard entirely the individual’s relation to God. What we were left with was a secularization of Christian religious individualism: The individual is what he is prior to and independent of family, nation, race, and social role and is not fundamentally defined by these. But with the individual’s relation to God discarded, he is now nothing more than a social atom who is nevertheless still supposed somehow to possess intrinsic worth and dignity. And this worth is exactly the same in all individuals. In other words, all men are equal.

The rights of man

For liberalism, the intrinsic worth of the individual is bound up with his ability to claim various “rights,” a crucial concept which we have so far not mentioned. The “liberty” supposedly championed by liberalism is founded on the idea that individuals innately possess certain fundamental rights. Individuals are “free” when those rights are respected.

Liberalism normally conceives of liberty as the absence of restraint or domination, but Mr. Benoist points out that, fundamentally, liberalism sets itself against any form of determination that would in any way limit the individual. “For liberalism,” Mr. Benoist writes, “man, far from being constituted as such by his bonds with others, must be thought of as an individual unbound by any constitutive form of belonging, i.e., outside any cultural or socio-historical context.”

Such forms of belonging are regarded with suspicion by liberalism because they make the individual less free in his choices — especially when they are not voluntarily chosen. This means that, effectively, liberalism sets itself against history, tradition, and nature. It becomes a denial of everything that transcends the atomic individual and his personal autonomy.

Mr. Benoist writes that the “ideal of ‘autonomy’. . . implied the rejection of every root as well as every inherited social bond.” To liberate or emancipate individuals meant breaking the bonds of community and freeing individuals from the circumstances into which they were born. “A radical devaluing of the past in the name of an optimistic vision of the future.”

The ability of the human subject to separate himself, even if only in his imagination, from all bonds and all historical context is regarded, moreover, as what makes him truly human. This position becomes radicalized in German philosophy through the discovery of “transcendental subjectivity” which can prescind from all attachments and is conceived as literally “unnatural,” since it defies analysis in naturalistic terms. While for the ancients the ideal was conforming ourselves to the natural order, for the moderns the ideal is freeing ourselves from it.

Human self-actualization is thus understood to be a process of liberating oneself from all unchosen connections or attachments. Hence, the liberal attitude that separating oneself from family and hometown are somehow positive things, signs of emancipation and maturation. City life is extolled and country life denigrated, for relocating to the city promises, for most, freedom from family and other unchosen relationships, from one’s past (“a fresh start”), and from parochialism.

One sees this today in the urban liberal attitude that those who stay where they were reared, who remain tied to family, and who live close to the land are backward, low-IQ hayseeds. However, when liberals see those very same traits in non-whites in underdeveloped countries, they are struck dumb with awe and feel a dim nostalgia for a pre-liberal past.

Modern individuals have intrinsic rights. When Jefferson said that we are “endowed by our creator” with inalienable rights, he meant we are born with them. Rights are not “conferred” on men by government. Effectively, this means, as Mr. Benoist points out, that the individual himself is the source of his rights.

Liberalism arrives at the theory of natural rights through a thought experiment that requires us to imagine individuals in a hypothetical “state of nature,” prior to coming together with others to form the “social contract.” In such a condition, according to Locke and others, individuals would have a natural right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of personal satisfaction, for in the state of nature we live freely and do as we please.

Of course, the very idea of a state of nature — a pre-historical time when human beings had no social relations at all — is not just implausible but inconceivable. Human beings have always lived in groups, as do the apes from which they evolved. Nevertheless, this peculiar idea is the philosophical basis for liberal-rights theory.

This feature of modern liberalism cannot be emphasized strongly enough, for it is a highly significant fact that classical liberalism arrives at its conception of human nature by abstracting man from society. Once again, the modern approach is the complete inversion of the ancient. Aristotle defined man as a political (i.e., social) animal, as well as a rational animal. Individuals derived their identities from their relations to others, within a definite cultural context into which they had been born.

The moderns, by contrast, try to understand the human individual by artificially removing him from all relations to others. But, if we do that, what is left? Virtually all of our uniquely human characteristics are socially embedded ones, such as language, morality, and the capacity for artistic expression.

When we abstract man from all social relations, all that is left is what he shares with the animals: appetite. Thus, modern liberal society conceives of man as exclusively a being of appetite, and individuals are motivated to behave in various ways through appeals to their appetitive nature. In addition, it is the promise of satisfying one’s appetites that is offered as compensation for the drudgery of the modern work world, the loss of family ties, the loss of religion, the alienation of urban life, and much else.

Significantly, liberalism has no conception of natural duties to complement its theory of natural rights. The reason for this, again, is that it regards social relations as effectively unnatural. We discover human nature by abstracting individuals from society and considering them in the state of nature. Since, by definition, there are no social relations in the state of nature, there can be no “natural duties.”

But if we define ourselves entirely in terms of the rights we hold as individuals, it follows that we owe nothing to society. We can participate in social life if we want to, but nothing obliges us to. “Freedom” for liberalism is fundamentally freedom from anything and everything unchosen, especially unchosen social relationships. This idea has become more radical over time, so that we are now told that we are free even from biological sex and may choose a different “gender identity” or create one out of whole cloth.

This stance creates serious problems for the liberal state. The foundations of liberalism exclude any idea of obligation to one’s community, and thus any way of demanding that individuals sacrifice for the whole. Thus, if a liberal society is in danger of attack or invasion, the state cannot count on citizens to risk their lives in its defense.

This problem has been considerably exacerbated by liberalism’s commitment, discussed earlier, to human interchangeability. Does anyone seriously imagine that the multicultural populations of France and Germany would fight for “their” countries, given that these countries are not even their own? Most probably, they would flee to the next safe country.

Mr. Benoist writes that “Liberals can insist all they like that the counterpart of liberty is responsibility; it is in fact obvious that as concerns ethics, they cannot develop the least conception of the good without contradicting their own principles.” Liberalism cannot advance a conception of the “common good” because it conceives society as an agglomeration of individuals each of whom is pursuing his own voluntarily chosen goods.

To demand that individuals recognize a “common good” beyond their own personal ends and, if necessary, sacrifice to uphold it, is anathema to liberalism. We are assured by Adam Smith that an “invisible hand” will harmonize these multiple ends. What results from this, however, is not a conception of the common good but merely one of a “general interest defined as the mere addition of particular interests.”

The reader might object that in the West we still find many examples of individuals behaving in a public-spirited fashion, and sometimes even making great sacrifices for others. This is true, but Mr. Benoist’s point is that liberalism can neither underwrite nor oblige such behavior.

In effect, these behaviors are survivals from pre-liberal society. Further, the reader has probably also noticed that they are increasingly rare. The trust and generosity my grandparents showed toward others during the Great Depression would be highly unusual today. These, too, are casualties of liberalism, and of the multiracial, multicultural society, which dramatically diminishes social trust, even among members of the same group. The terms “common good” and “self-sacrifice” are almost never heard in public discourse today.

The strange contradictions of “liberals” and “conservatives”

As noted earlier, both today’s “liberals” and “conservatives” are united in their commitment to liberalism in Mr. Benoist’s sense of the term. This is especially the case with the “mainstream” Left and Right in the US and Britain. It is only on the margins of Left and Right that one finds genuine critics of liberalism, and they are entirely excluded by the dominant political parties.

The mainstream Left ceased many years ago to be critical of capitalism and individualism. The “injustice” it claims to combat now has nothing to do with the exploitation of workers by bosses. Instead, it consists in various forms of “discrimination” — against blacks, women, gays, the transgendered, or others.

The Left is perpetually looking for some new group to liberate, but in no way is liberation ever a genuine threat to the system. Usually, the chief objection to these forms of discrimination is that they have prevented the oppressed from fully benefiting from the market economy.

Mr. Benoist writes that,

A high priority was . . . assigned [by the contemporary Left] to denouncing “ontological” inequalities linked to sexism, racism, religious fanaticism, etc., at the expense of all the concrete inequalities produced by social policies of liberal inspiration. Equality is henceforward assimilated to the critique of “stereotypes” and the “overcoming of taboos,” while economic exploitation is passed over in silence.

Perhaps today’s “conservatives” are an even more loathsome spectacle. Philosophically, true conservatism is completely opposed to liberalism — and thus to both capitalism and individualism. True conservatives are critics of the liberal ideal of “progress” and the ideology of the “rights of man,” which makes the individual will sovereign.

True conservatives emphasize the situatedness of individuals with respect to history, social relations, and homeland. According to conservatism, it is from this situatedness that individuals derive their identity, and sense of belonging. As we have seen, however, liberalism not only dismisses these sorts of relations but actively undermines them.

Mr. Benoist quotes philosopher Laurent Fourquet writing that, “The activist who fights ‘for the family’ but enthusiastically preaches so-called ultra-liberalism as soon as the talk turns to economics is not merely inconsistent: he is useless.” Mr. Benoist himself denounces those “conservatives” who think they can defend both the market system and the “‘traditional values’ that this system continues to bulldoze.”

Particularly grotesque are “conservatives” who rail against the “welfare state,” heedless of the fact that it is actually a creation of the economic liberalism they champion. Liberalism has gradually destroyed the organic bonds of family and community on which individuals used to be able to rely when in distress. The welfare state is actually a response to the rise of individualism, which it aggravates further by transforming its beneficiaries into atomized dependents with little sense of community or social responsibility.

Karl Marx himself recognized that, contrary to the assertions of his latter-day apostles, capitalism is neither “conservative” nor “patriarchal.” In Mr. Benoist’s words, for Marx it “actually constitutes a permanent revolutionary force,” given that market forces are continually replacing the old and familiar with the new and different.

Basic to conservatism is a sense of limits; what Thomas Sowell has called conservatism’s “constrained vision.” But as Mr. Benoist notes, “how can one profess a sense of limits while adhering to an economic system whose essence resides in the limitlessness of the market and the endless accumulation of capital, i.e., a system whose planetary development involves the destruction of everything one would like to conserve?”

If we look for an alternative to the liberalism of moderate Leftists and of phony pro-market “conservatives,” we will not find it in the radical Left. Mr. Benoist points out that Marxism shares fundamental premises with liberalism. For one thing, it extolls the myth of progress just as much as capitalists do.

Just like capitalism, Marxism’s conception of the human good is thoroughly materialistic (hence Heidegger’s famous claim that capitalism and communism are “metaphysically identical”). Marxists do not seek to overcome what Mr. Benoist calls the “religion of production,” they merely seek to change who owns the factories.

“Traditional Marxism,” Mr. Benoist notes, “wanted to break wage-slavery but never questioned the very principle of modern labor. In other words, it wanted to liberate labor but not liberate us from it.” Marx’s materialism prevented him from seeing the bourgeoisie as the true homo economicus. His classless society, Mr. Benoist observes, is for all intents and purposes “a bourgeoisie that includes everyone.”

Today, the only real alternative to liberalism is to be found on the “Far Right,” in the form of conservative critiques of the market system and of individualism. Such viewpoints are becoming increasingly popular in the Anglophone West, thanks to the internet and the rise of right-leaning “new media.”

On the European continent, of course, a kind of “Right-Wing Socialism” has long been a part of political life, as exemplified by the Fascists and National Socialists, and all those rightists today who are smeared by association with them. It is only in the US and Britain that socialism has been seen as exclusively a phenomenon of the Left.

What is to be done?

We can certainly locate Alain de Benoist among the “Right-Wing Socialists,” but the alternative to liberalism he sketches in this book is rather tepid. He advocates a “communitarian” point of view, insisting, correctly, that liberalism’s “pre-social” view of man is completely untenable.

“For communitarians,” Mr. Benoist writes, “there can be no doubt that if modern man is constantly in search of himself, it is because his identity is no longer constituted by anything.” He insists that society must not only provide men with the means of existence, but also “reasons to live.”

To combat liberalism, Mr. Benoist advocates “a renewed citizenship based on participation and collective grassroots action.” We must once again give priority to the “common” and to “being-in-relation.”

What Mr. Benoist fails to mention anywhere in Against Liberalism, however, is that achieving these goals is impossible without ethnic and cultural homogeneity. How can we give priority to the “common” when France is now made up of warring tribes that have nothing in common?

How can the French achieve “being-in-relation” with members of alien cultures who do not share their values and are actively hostile to them?

How can meaning be restored to France when its citizens can no longer agree on a shared source of meaning?

One strongly suspects that Mr. Benoist would concede these points, but in the present volume he is being cagey.

Despites these reservations, Against Liberalism is a fascinating and endlessly thought-provoking work, and I have merely skimmed the surface. The book will be particularly valuable reading for American conservatives, who may be shocked to discover that they are far more “liberal” than they ever imagined.

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