By Ivan Kesic
According to American media, defense news outlets, and independent analysts, the 12-day Israeli military aggression against Iran significantly depleted the US stockpile of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) interceptor missiles.
Citing official sources, American magazine Newsweek reported on Friday that the US transferred a substantial portion of its advanced missile defense capabilities to support the Israeli regime, an effort with questionable results and a critical impact on US strategic reserves.
THAAD, developed by Lockheed Martin arms manufacturing company, is a key component of Israel’s multi-layered air defense architecture. It is designed to intercept medium-range ballistic missiles, including those launched from Iran and Yemen.
The US-made system is capable of targeting short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles during their terminal phase, whether inside or outside Earth’s atmosphere.
THAAD uses a “hit-to-kill” method, relying on kinetic energy rather than explosive warheads to destroy incoming threats, intercepting at altitudes of up to 150 km and ranges between 150-200 km.
Operated exclusively by American personnel, the US military maintains eight THAAD batteries with an estimated 350–400 interceptors in total. The eighth battery was activated during the June 20 Israeli aggression against Iran and is capable of intercepting hypersonic missiles.
Deployment in the occupied territories
At the outset of the Israeli aggression against Iran, seven THAAD batteries were operational, two of which had been deployed in the occupied Palestinian territories.
The first THAAD battery was stationed there in October 2024, following Iran’s “True Promise 1 and 2” operations, during which Israel’s domestic air defense systems, David’s Sling, Arrow 2, and Arrow 3, suffered notable failures. A second battery was deployed in April 2025.
These US-operated systems played a crucial role during the June 2025 confrontation with Iran, although their exact deployment locations remain classified for military reasons.
Based on available information, of the remaining US THAAD batteries, two are deployed within the United States, one in Texas and another in Guam.
The rest are stationed overseas in South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), with the UAE being the only country to have formally purchased its own THAAD systems.
A THAAD battery is a mobile, self-contained missile defense unit. Each battery typically comprises six truck-mounted launchers, with each launcher carrying eight interceptor missiles, amounting to a total of 48 interceptors per battery.
In addition, the system includes an AN/TPY-2 radar for long-range detection and tracking (up to 2,000-3,000 km), a fire control and communication system for coordinating intercepts, along with support equipment and approximately 100 personnel to operate the unit.
Given the deployment of two batteries in the occupied Palestinian territories, it can be estimated that the Israeli regime had access to at least 96 interceptor missiles.
However, the actual number was likely higher due to frequent resupply efforts during engagements with Yemeni ballistic missiles and in preparation for the broader conflict with Iran.
Mixed performance against Yemeni missiles
Despite being touted as one of the most advanced missile defense systems in the world, THAAD’s performance against Yemeni ballistic missile attacks has been mixed, even according to Israeli and Western sources.
While some interceptions have been claimed as successful, there have been notable failures.
By the end of March 2025, six successful interceptions of Yemeni missiles had been reported. However, on May 4 and May 9, THAAD failed to intercept missiles targeting Ben Gurion Airport.
In both instances, Israeli sources asserted that the incoming missiles were ultimately intercepted by the Arrow missile defense system instead.
This claim has been met with skepticism, as the Arrow system typically engages threats at far greater distances, tens or even hundreds of kilometers away, yet the airport was struck directly.
The Israeli regime’s own admission that multiple systems were used against the same class of Yemeni missiles suggests that the interception cost is significantly higher than commonly assumed. Rather than a one-to-one missile-to-interceptor ratio, several interceptors, possibly from different systems, may be required to ensure a successful shootdown.
Despite ongoing claims by American and Israeli officials about the effectiveness and reliability of both THAAD and Arrow systems, Yemen has continued to target Ben Gurion Airport as part of its retaliatory operations. The continued threat and perceived vulnerability led nearly all international airlines to suspend flights to and from Israel.
The most commonly used long-range weapon in the Yemeni arsenal is the Palestine-2 – a two-stage hypersonic ballistic missile capable of reaching speeds up to Mach 16 and equipped with a maneuverable warhead. This type of missile poses a significant challenge to traditional missile defense systems, including THAAD.
Technologically, THAAD faces several limitations. These include radar difficulties in distinguishing between actual warheads and decoys, vulnerability to saturation by large-scale missile barrages, and diminished effectiveness against newer hypersonic and maneuverable missile designs.
The system also relies exclusively on US personnel for its operation, which can limit rapid adaptability in dynamic combat scenarios.
THAAD has experienced test failures in the past, raising concerns about its reliability and operational readiness. These failures have been linked to software bugs, mechanical faults, and targeting system errors, factors that cast doubt on its real-world performance under pressure.
Failures against Iranian missile strikes
During the 12-day war of aggression against Iran, THAAD’s performance deteriorated significantly, highlighted by its low interception rate and the rapid depletion of US and Israeli interceptor stockpiles.
On the eve of the Israeli aggression, approximately 100 THAAD interceptor missiles were positioned in the occupied Palestinian territories. In response, Iran launched between 370 and 500 ballistic missiles during its retaliatory operations, a volume that far exceeded available THAAD capacity.
While Israel also relied on other systems such as David’s Sling, Arrow-2, and Arrow-3, the sheer scale and intensity of Iran’s response shifted the strategic balance. The damage inflicted throughout Israeli-occupied territories underscored this imbalance.
In the initial days of the war, Iran deliberately used older liquid-fueled ballistic missiles to exhaust enemy air defenses. More advanced and maneuverable missiles were introduced only after Israel’s interceptor supply had been significantly drained.
Although no official statistics have been released regarding the number of THAAD interceptors used or their success rates, available evidence suggests a poor performance.
High-altitude kinetic interceptions, hallmarked by bright explosions visible across the region, were rare, and many may have involved Arrow systems instead of THAAD.
A particularly telling open-source analysis, based on video footage by Jordanian photographer Zaid M. Al-Abbadi, missile ignition signatures, and geolocation data, estimated that Israel used 39 THAAD, 34 Arrow-3, and 9 Arrow-2 interceptors during just one of more than 20 Iranian missile barrages.
Given such high rates of interceptor use, analysts believe THAAD batteries likely exhausted their missile supply within the first four to five days of the conflict.
This rapid depletion, combined with underwhelming interception success, highlights the system’s limitations in a high-intensity, multi-wave missile war.
Exhausted stockpiles and soaring costs
Estimates from military experts and news outlets place the unit cost of a single THAAD interceptor between $12 million and $15 million. However, other sources suggest the real cost is significantly higher.
In a statement to Newsweek, Sidharth Kaushal of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) noted that while the production cost of a THAAD interceptor is approximately $18 million, the total cost rises to $27 million when research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) expenses are factored in.
Estimates of total THAAD-related spending during the recent conflict vary. Analysts suggest that between $500 million and $800 million worth of interceptors may have been expended, corresponding to the use of 40 to 60 missiles.
On Tuesday, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, citing Israeli military sources, reported that approximately 200 American and Israeli interceptor missiles were launched in total, at an estimated cost of 5 billion shekels – nearly $1.5 billion.
What all sources agree on is that the THAAD interceptor stockpile has been significantly depleted. At least one full battery’s worth, 48 interceptors, is believed to have been expended.
Considering the two THAAD batteries deployed and the high operational tempo due to prior Yemeni missile attacks, the actual figure may be closer to 96 interceptors. This would represent a reduction of roughly 30 percent of the entire US THAAD interceptor stockpile.
Open-source analysts also highlight the limited pace of US procurement: only 41 THAAD interceptors have been ordered over the past three years, including units designated for export customers. This slow replenishment rate underscores the vulnerability of even advanced missile defense systems when faced with sustained, high-volume missile warfare.
In stark contrast, Iran and China maintain vast ballistic missile arsenals, numbering in the thousands, making the rapid depletion of the US inventory, largely to defend Israeli territory, all the more striking.
Newsweek contacted the Pentagon for comment regarding the depletion and cost implications. The Department of Defense declined to elaborate, stating only that it had “nothing to provide.”
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