Trump wants to stop nuclear proliferation. STRATCOM could play a major role.

Last Monday, President Donald Trump pronounced, “We can’t let nuclear weapons proliferate.” Two days later, Secretary of State Rubio met with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi and recommitted the United States to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

After America’s bombing of Iran’s suspect nuclear sites, there’s cause to take these commitments seriously, but only if it’s more than a one off.

Emphasizing consistency is essential. Historically, America has backed nonproliferation in fits and starts. Under Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter, the United States opposed the recycling of plutonium for commercial use because it was too close to bombmaking. It blocked reprocessing activities in South Korea, Taiwan, and Brazil. 

Washington was not as firm with Pakistan, India, and — until recently — with Iran. Iraq was a major exception: The United States not only bombed Saddam’s nuclear plants, but imposed one of the world’s toughest international nuclear inspection regimes. Not many years later, though, Washington cut untenable nonproliferation bargains with North Korea and Iran, giving the impression nonproliferation was less a matter of enforcement than a negotiating opportunity.      

With its actions in June, this administration drew a clear red line against Iranian nuclear fuel-making. To make this prohibition stick, though, Washington has to oppose nuclear fuel-making in other countries that might launch nuclear power programs.

An immediate case is Saudi Arabia — a country the United States wants to strike a nuclear cooperative deal with that would help Riyadh enrich uranium. Riyadh says if Iran gets a bomb, Saudi Arabia will too.

Then, there is the question of what Washington should do if Iran withdraws from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Back in 2003, Pyongyang was caught violating its pledge not to enrich and then withdrew from the treaty. Washington sat on its hands. Three years later, North Korea got the bomb. Will the Trump administration blink again if Iran follows through on its threat to do the same?

The adequacy of IAEA inspections is another issue. They clearly didn’t keep Iran from getting as close as it has to a bomb. The IAEA admits that it can’t be held responsible for discovering covert nuclear facilities. Their inspections are too infrequent and geared only to detect nuclear diversions that are much larger than what’s needed to make a bomb.

Worse, the IAEA claims anything it looks at is safeguarded. Yet, making nuclear fuel brings you within weeks of getting a bomb — too little time to allow outside authorities to intervene. The IAEA may be able to monitor fuel-making, but this can’t be counted upon to prevent military diversions.

Spreading nuclear facilities that the IAEA can only monitor is a mistake. Nuclear power systems fueled with uranium that can be quickly turned into bombs or that encourage the recycling of weapons-usable plutonium ought now to be viewed as dangerous business and potentially tomorrow’s targets.

When it comes to exporting such systems, nuclear supplier states, including the United States, have fecklessly operated on a case-by-case basis — offering unique “peaceful” deals to India, Iraq, and Iran, that were too easily transmuted into bomb options. The Trump administration’s bombing of Iran has set a precedent and put a momentary stop against this practice. It now has a chance to distinguish itself by making it stick.

How would America enforce firm nonproliferation standards? Speak softly, and carry a big stick.

The White House should order the creation of a Nonproliferation Enforcement Initiative, which would be tasked with planning any follow-on strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities, interdicting nuclear weapons transfers to non-weapons states, and neutralizing other dangerous nuclear weapons-related activities. This nonproliferation enforcement unit would coordinate its operations and planning with relevant geographic and technical commands.

As part of that NEI, US Strategic Command should be ordered to stand up a new nonproliferation-specific unit, made up of two branches. First, it should include its own nonproliferation intelligence analytic and tasking staff with new sources of intelligence other than Israel and the IAEA. And second, there should be tangible military assets, including bombers armed with penetrating munitions, which are specifically tasked with being a fast response to the threat of nuclear proliferation around the globe.

Setting this up would likely require taking assets from other parts of STRATCOM and placing them under a different command structure, which will of course ruffle feathers along the way. But if nonproliferation is a true mission set for this White House, then it should be ready to align the military along those lines.

This initiative would also galvanize US and allied nonproliferation policymakers to clarify just what redlines mattered most — something previous administrations have struggled with. More important, it would get other nations and would-be bombmakers to take nonproliferation seriously.

Trump has shown that he is willing to use the big stick to stop nuclear proliferation. Creating a unit to wield this stick would make good on this commitment.

Henry Sokolski is executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, was deputy for nonproliferation policy in the Department of Defense (1989-1993), and is author of China, Russia, and the Coming Cool War (2024).