NC Supreme Court rules against former trooper in ‘good moral character’ case

The North Carolina Supreme Court has reversed lower court decisions and ruled against a former state trooper seeking to be recertified as a law enforcement officer in the state. A state commission had determined that plaintiff Maurice Devalle lacked “good moral character.”

Both a trial judge and the North Carolina Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Devalle and against the group that denied his recertification.

The Supreme Court split, 5-2, Friday in overturning those decisions.

“In this case we determine whether respondent North Carolina Sheriffs’ Education and Training Standards Commission arbitrarily or capriciously denied petitioner’s application for justice officer certification upon concluding he lacked the good moral character required of deputy sheriffs,” Chief Justice Paul Newby wrote for the court’s majority. “To answer this question, we apply the whole record test, under which we consider whether substantial evidence supports the findings, conclusions, and result of respondent’s decision.”

“Here petitioner’s sworn testimony constitutes substantial evidence supporting respondent’s conclusion that he lacked the requisite candor and truthfulness at the times relevant to his petition,” Newby added. “We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.”

Devalle served in the North Carolina State Highway Patrol from 1998 to 2017. The patrol fired him after an investigation revealed that he had supplied a false home address and submitted false time sheets. He lived in Wake County while claiming to comply with patrol rules dictating that he live closer to his Wayne County post, according to court filings.

Within days of losing his job, he accepted a new job as a Columbus County deputy sheriff and school resource officer. “He did not wait to rebuild his reputation but instead immediately applied with respondent — the administrative agency with oversight of sheriffs and their deputies — for justice officer certification,” Newby wrote.

“The undisputed evidence shows that petitioner worked diligently to restore his character and reputation,” Newby added.

Yet the commission informed Devalle in January 2019 that it intended to deny his certification application “because its Probable Cause Committee had determined that he lacked good moral character,” the chief justice explained.

Devalle contested the decision. After a December 2019 hearing, an administrative law judge raised concerns about his “lack of candor and sincerity.” Despite those concerns, the ALJ concluded that testimony from the Columbus County sheriff and a high school principal proved his “successful character rehabilitation.”

The commission disagreed. After a final decision went against Devalle, he took the dispute to court.

Newby encouraged the commission to define “good moral character” to avoid confusion in future disputes.

“In this case, however, there is nothing confusing about why petitioner’s evasive responses might have reasonably led respondent to question his candor and truthfulness, especially when petitioner gave his answers under oath and at a hearing specifically conducted to examine his character’s rehabilitation,” the chief justice wrote. “The nature of our criminal justice system often requires law enforcement officers to give sworn testimony on sensitive topics — perhaps the circumstances surrounding a murder or the reasons for searching a suspect’s car. Honesty is of paramount importance.”

“The people of North Carolina expect law enforcement to possess not only the ability to tell the truth but also the resolve to exercise it in uncomfortable situations,” Newby added. “One does not need to carefully consult court cases to understand this basic tenet of good moral character.”

“Although petitioner had every opportunity at the hearing to acknowledge the misconduct that ‘very much concerned’ the Highway Patrol and Secretary, including petitioner’s ‘demonstrated pattern’ of being ‘deliberately untruthful,’ he refused to do so,” the court opinion continued. “Instead, he insisted that he ‘did not violate [the truthfulness] policy’ because he ‘was truthful the entire time with the Highway Patrol’ and claimed he could not remember basic details of his termination. Given petitioner’s ability to recount these events in detail upon questioning from his own attorney — in other words, when it benefitted him — we cannot conclude that respondent’s concerns about his character were arbitrary or capricious.”

The decision “does not prevent petitioner from seeking certification in the future,” Newby added.

The state Supreme Court’s five Republican justices supported the majority decision. The two Democrats dissented.

“I agree with the majority that ‘character rehabilitation and forgiveness are principles deeply rooted in the common law and our State’s history,’” Justice Allison Riggs wrote in dissent. “The majority’s analysis, however, is hard to accord with those principles and is likely to confuse employees and employers alike an area of employment law that affects countless North Carolinians.”

“[T]he Commission’s current lack of a more pertinent and definitive definition of ‘good moral character’ in the context of law enforcement officers fails to put law enforcement officers on notice of what constitutes good moral character,” Riggs added. “No North Carolina appellate court has provided clarity on the term as applied in the law enforcement context.”

“How can the Commission expect law enforcement officers to meet a moral character requirement without a clear definition — by deciphering case law as non-attorneys? While the majority acknowledges this lack of clarity and now urges the Commission to define ‘good moral character’ rather than citing to case law, Officer Devalle operated under the Commission’s and our precedents’ vague definitions,” the dissent continued.

“The Commission’s denial of Officer Devalle’s certification reinforces that the lack of a consistent and clear meaning of ‘good moral character’ and the lack of clear enforcement standards renders enforcement actions ‘problematic and difficult,’ or, in other words, arbitrary and capricious,” Riggs wrote.

“The majority’s opinion affirms a vague standard that fails to put law enforcement officers on notice of what they need to do to reestablish good moral character,” she added. “The majority suggests that law enforcement officers seeking to regain meaningful employment must somehow satisfy the Commission through demonstrable acts of contrition, but what is sufficient remains unclear.”

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