AMTI is not air battle management: Why the US needs the E-7 now

In modern aerial warfare, victory hinges on turning raw data into decisive action. Yet, a dangerous misconception in parts of the Department of Defense is now equating Airborne Moving Target Indicator (AMTI) data, snapshots of moving targets from radar-based systems like space-based satellites, with the orchestration of air battle management.

This fallacy threatens US air superiority, especially against near-peer adversary China, whose advanced anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities demand more than passive surveillance. AMTI informs, but only human-led air battle management, supported by platforms like the Boeing E-7 Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft, directs fighters, deconflicts lethal effects, and secures the skies.

Canceling the E-7 program in favor of an unproven space-based AMTI capability that is years, if not decades, away from realization, is a strategic misstep. Congress and the DoD must reverse this decision, accelerate E-7 acquisition, and build a layered sensing architecture to win future conflicts.

AMTI, whether from the E-3 AWACS or satellites, detects and tracks airborne targets, offering critical situational awareness. But data alone doesn’t win wars. Air battle management involves skilled personnel who interpret that data, align it with a commander’s intent, and direct assets in real time.

History proves this. In Operation Desert Storm, E-3 AWACS provided AMTI data, but air battle managers aboard orchestrated 85 percent of the over 90,000 sorties, enabling 38 of 41 air-to-air kills. Similarly, during the Battle of Britain, the Dowding System’s radar data was useless without human controllers directing Spitfires against the Luftwaffe. Today, even advanced F-35s or F-22s can’t handle theater-wide air battle management while fighting. Pilots need dedicated AEW&C aircraft like the E-7 to maintain dominance.

The E-3 needs to be replaced, and the E-7, with its advanced multirole electronically scanned array (MESA) radar, offers superior detection, jamming resistance, and coalition integration. Yet, the DoD proposes canceling its acquisition in the fiscal 2026 budget, citing cost increases from $588 million to $724 million per aircraft and survivability concerns in contested environments. Critics within the Office of the Secretary of Defense argue that Navy E-2D Hawkeyes can substitute for the E-7 until space-based AMTI is deployed, but this is a flawed approach.

First, the cost comparison mixes current and future dollars, inflating E-7 expenses while ignoring similar escalations for space alternatives. Second, the E-2D, with its smaller crew and limited radar range, is less capable and more vulnerable than the E-7 against advanced threats. Finally, space-based AMTI passing data only addresses a portion of the air battle management mission, ignoring the highly trained personnel required to translate the data into direction.

Let’s be clear: Space is no panacea. As retired Gen. Kevin Chilton recently warned, “The space domain today is … arguably more vulnerable than any other.” Satellites are vulnerable to China’s anti-satellite weapons, lasers, and cyberattacks. A single nuclear detonation in low-Earth orbit could cripple entire constellations. Relying solely on space-based AMTI risks leaving US forces without the real-time direction needed in dynamic conflicts, like a potential Taiwan Strait scenario where China’s AEW&C outnumbers US assets. Even Space Force leaders, like Lt. Gen. Shawn Bratton, advocate for a layered approach combining space, air, and ground assets for redundancy and resilience.

The obvious counter is to ask why data can’t just be beamed down from space assets to a command center on the ground. But Battlefield Control Centers and emerging C2BM systems do not have organic sensors, relying solely on ingesting feeds from outside sources to conduct their air battle management mission — outside sources that could be disrupted, kinetically or non-kinetically. 

Also remember that while all services perform battle management, only the Air Force specializes in air battle management to achieve air superiority, which requires dynamic mobility in a near-peer conflict. Ground-based equivalents like the Control and Reporting Center (CRC), now being equipped with the less mobile (though more capable) AN/TPY-4 radar, are inherently limited in supporting forward operations due to their terrestrial constraints.

Without an E-7, no USAF C2BM entity could sustain theater air superiority pursuits, creating a single point of failure. With an E-7, you can ingest space-based AMTI alongside ground sensors, offering multi-domain resiliency that prevents an enemy from neutralizing one layer and undermining US theater air dominance.

The solution is straightforward: Congress must restore E-7 funding, and the DoD must prioritize its rapid fielding while developing space-based AMTI as a complement, not a replacement.

A layered sensing architecture that integrates satellites for persistent coverage, E-7s for flexible management, and ground nodes like Control and Reporting Centers for backup will ensure resilience. As the North American Aerospace Defense Command and US Northern Command commander Gen. Gregory Guillot emphasized, the E-7’s AMTI and air battle management capabilities are “essential” for Golden Dome defenses against cruise missiles and drones. With possible space-based capabilities not maturing until the 2030s, the E-7 bridges a critical gap against rising threats.

AMTI is not air battle management; it is the raw data that skilled air battle managers can shape into victory. The US cannot afford to gamble on unproven space solutions that will not be realized for many years into the future. Congress and the DoD must act now to reinstate the E-7 program and commit to layered sensing to secure air superiority as soon as possible.

Lt. Col. Grant “SWAT” Georgulis, USAF, is a Master Air Battle Manager and currently assigned as the Deputy Chief of C2 Inspections as part of the Headquarters NORAD and U.S. NORTHCOM Inspector General team. The views expressed in this article are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the United States Air Force.