With Assad gone and Iran hobbled, the time is ripe for a stable Middle East

The recent demonstration of Israeli and American military prowess in Iran has given rise to a new pathway to regional integration: an incremental progression that starts with security cooperation, moving to economic, technological and civil infrastructure partnerships, and eventually culminating in full normalization.

It may not be the traditional model of diplomacy, exemplified by the Abraham Accords’ approach of formal agreements followed by cooperation. But in a region defined by millennia of confused relationships, why does that need to be the only path forward?

There are two test cases to watch in the region: Syria and Lebanon. First, let’s look at Syria, where the new government under Ahmad al-Sharaa is facing an early credibility test. Ace it, and it could have major impacts on attempts by the big players in the Middle East to replace Iran’s fundamentalist stranglehold on the region with an era of pragmatic stability. Drop the ball, and Syria could find itself once again between a rock and a hard place.

To be recognized as the legitimate representative of all Syrians, Sharaa must demonstrate the will to protect the country’s diverse minorities, including Druze, Christians, Alawites and Kurds. This is not merely about good governance. It’s about proving that Syria can transition from a sectarian battleground to a unified nation where all communities can feel secure and the ongoing cycle of internecine conflict is halted. 

Though the Sharaa government’s political will is crucial, it isn’t enough. At least as important, Sharaa must also show that he is capable of carrying through on the goal of protecting those minority groups, despite the armed militias and tribal groups looking to assert their own power through force.

The recent clashes between the Druze community and Bedouin tribes in southern Syria, which led to over 1,100 deaths, underscore the urgency of these twin challenges of committing to minority protection and ensuring it in practice. Syrian security forces intervened in the clashes and killed scores of Druze, reportedly carried out a massacre at a hospital in the predominantly Druze city of Suweida, and violated Druze cultural norms by filming the forced shaving of Druze men’s mustaches.

Israel launched attacks on Syria to signal that it will not stand by as the Sharaa government harms the Druze community, “owing to the deep covenant of blood with our Druze citizens in Israel and their historical and familial link to the Druze in Syria,” as Israeli leaders put it.

Israel’s commitment to protecting Syria’s Druze population stems in part from historical bonds forged when the Druze community chose to cooperate with the nascent Jewish state, and in part from other strategic objectives, such as ensuring a demilitarized zone in southern Syria, near the Israeli border, and keeping jihadists out. (The move may also be an implied statement of support to Palestinians in Gaza who might be willing to cooperate with Israel against Hamas, a way of showing that Israel is committed to protecting its allies.)

Israeli leaders have been clear they are prepared to act again if need be to protect the Druze. But it’s not in Israel’s long-term benefit to be in constant conflict with Syria. This is where the Sharaa government can seize the initiative.

If Syria shows it can govern inclusively and protect all its minority groups — as well as provide guarantees against terrorist deployment along its borders and commit to blocking weapons transfers to fundamentalists — Israel could gradually withdraw from most of the Syrian side of the Golan Heights that the Israeli army took over in late 2024. The next phase could involve financial and civil cooperation, including Israeli backing for U.S. sanctions relief on Syria and participation in Syrian reconstruction efforts.

Another example can be seen in Lebanon. Certainly, the Lebanese people would have preferred not to suffer from the back and forth conflict between Hezbollah and Israel over the last few years. But with Iran unable to back its proxy, the new Lebanese government is finally able to take a strong stance against Hezbollah. And it’s not hard to picture Lebanon, freed from Iranian and Syrian dominance, could see its cease-fire with Israel evolve if it is able to fully disarm Hezbollah, as the government appears poised to push for.

For the first time in nearly half a century, the Iranian threat that has defined Middle Eastern geopolitics is rapidly diminishing, creating unprecedented opportunities for peace and normalization. The fundamentalist forces that launched the Oct. 7, 2023, assault on Israel, and fought in so many campaigns over the last 40 years, have found themselves systematically subdued (or, in the Assad dynasty’s case, overthrown): Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Assad regime in Syria, and Iran itself stripped of key nuclear facilities and air defense systems.

This dramatic reversal has made the impossible suddenly look like it’s within range. Whereas normalization between Israel and the Arab world — including former enemies like Syria and Lebanon — seemed barely fathomable yesterday, the Middle East has reached an inflection point that turns normalization into an achievable possibility.

Meanwhile, Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and Oman already have working relationships with Israel and are further along on the path toward practical cooperation. Next steps could include cooperation on issues like Red Sea shipping security and more bilateral business, travel and collaboration on technology and infrastructure, like the project of building Saudi Arabia’s futuristic city Neom. This vision could ultimately extend beyond the immediate region to include North African countries and non-Arab Muslim nations.

Iran’s decline and the collapse of its proxy network have opened a window that may not remain open indefinitely. On one side lies a return to the familiar patterns of conflict and instability. On the other lies the possibility of a region where former enemies — including Syria and Israel — gradually start to become partners, where security cooperation enables economic prosperity, and where the dream of Middle Eastern normalization finally becomes reality.

Now regional leaders must show the world they have the courage and vision to seize this historic opportunity before the window closes.

Yossi Kuperwasser, a retired Israeli brigadier general, leads the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security. He is a former head of the research division of the Israel Defense Forces’ military intelligence directorate and director-general of the Israeli Ministry of Strategic Affairs.