France’s Grand Mosque Took Orders from Algeria to Back Macron for President — in Exchange for a Halal Monopoly, America Is Next

When Emmanuel Macron cruised to re-election in 2022, one of his most visible endorsements came from an unlikely source: the rector of the Grand Mosque of Paris, Chems-Eddine Hafiz. In the weeks before the vote, Hafiz publicly urged Muslims to back Macron over Marine Le Pen. He now admits the endorsement was made “at the request” of Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune.

Within months, the French government handed the Grand Mosque an exclusive, government-recognized monopoly over halal certification for all European exports to Algeria—a multimillion-euro market covering meat, dairy, cosmetics, and more. French officials privately estimate the mosque’s annual take at well above €15 million, while independent lawmakers have suggested the real figure could be multiples higher.

The deal, described by European Parliament members as a distortion of competition and a breach of secular principles, illustrates the merging of religious, economic, and geopolitical influence: foreign political backing traded for economic privilege.

A Political Embassy in Religious Clothing

The Grand Mosque of Paris is not just a place of worship. Built in 1926 as a memorial to Muslim soldiers who fought for France in World War I, it has long been a symbolic and political touchpoint between France and North Africa. Its leadership, historically appointed with Algeria’s blessing, has served as an informal channel for diplomatic messages, favors, and—at times—covert intelligence coordination.

French diplomats have called Hafiz “the true ambassador of Algiers” in Paris. He is used as a go-between on politically “sensitive issues”, like the imprisonment of Algerian writer Boualem Sansal, when official channels are strained.

The mosque’s general administrator, Mohammed Louanoughi, is a former Algerian secret service (DRS) officer described by former staff as “the eye of Algiers” inside the mosque, tasked with monitoring the diaspora and overseeing Algerian-appointed imams. His presence highlights the concerning operational role a foreign government can play inside a religious institution.

From Political Operator to Power Consolidator

Hafiz’s ascent to rector in 2020 was described by insiders as a “putsch” engineered at Algeria’s direction. His predecessor, Dalil Boubakeur, suddenly resigned in his favor after being promised perks—including a lifetime driver. Hafiz also brought Louanoughi up to the general administrator.

By 2023, the mosque’s role turned overtly transactional. After Macron ended France’s decades-old system of state-paid imams from Algeria, a significant funding stream, Tebboune compensated by granting the mosque the sole authority to certify halal products for Algerian-bound exports from any EU member state.

Every shipment now carries the mosque’s stamp and its fee. European exporters have complained of inflated costs, opaque rules, and zero competitive alternatives. Internally, only “three guys” process the certifications, generating millions in revenue with minimal oversight. The French foreign ministry estimates the real profit could be four times Hafiz’s declared figure.

The Playbook at Work

The Paris-Algiers arrangement follows a repeatable formula:

• Foreign power cultivates a domestic religious leader—financially, politically, or both.
• The leader delivers political influence inside the host country on behalf of the foreign power’s preferred candidates.
• The host government rewards the religious institution with exclusive economic privileges.
• The cycle repeats, deepening the foreign state’s influence in domestic politics and commerce.

Because this activity is framed in religious terms, it often escapes the transparency and disclosure rules that apply to corporate lobbying or foreign political donations.

American Vulnerabilities

The United States is not immune to this model—in fact, several elements already exist here.

Foreign-Funded Religious Institutions

Many large U.S. mosques and Islamic centers have received direct or indirect funding from foreign governments or state-backed charities:

• Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) – Has engaged in collaborations with foreign Islamic ministries and organizations, including Malaysia’s Department of Islamic Development (JAKIM) and the Saudi-based Muslim World League, in areas such as halal certification standards and religious outreach. These ties enable cross-border coordination on religious policy and can open channels for funding, training, and the promotion of aligned ideological positions.
• King Fahad Mosque, Culver City, CA – Built between 1994 and 1998 with $2–8 million from the Saudi government, inaugurated by then-Crown Prince (later King) Abdullah, and administered under the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs. The mosque has hosted Saudi religious attachés and functions as a hub for Saudi-linked religious programming.
• Turkish Diyanet Mosques – Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) directly funds and staffs mosques in U.S. states including New Jersey, Massachusetts, Maryland, and Ohio. Turkish-trained imams are appointed by Ankara and remain on the Turkish government payroll while serving in the U.S.
• Pakistan-Linked Charities – U.S. mosques in Texas, New York, and Illinois have received funding from Pakistan-based religious charities, some of which have been flagged internationally for extremist links. These funds have been used for mosque construction, renovations, and Islamic school expansions.
• Kuwait Government-Funded Mosques – Kuwait’s Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs and the state-controlled International Islamic Charitable Organization (IICO) have financed mosque construction and Islamic centers in several U.S. states, including in Utah, New Jersey, Michigan, and California. These projects are often publicized in Kuwaiti media but draw little attention in U.S. press. In some cases, the Kuwaiti government’s name appears on the building’s dedication plaque.

Foreign funding often comes with political expectations—whether overt (advocating for specific foreign policies) or tacit (opposing critics of the donor country).

Why This Avoids Scrutiny

Foreign funding for religious purposes in the U.S. is not illegal and is rarely investigated unless tied directly to terrorism financing. Because religious organizations have expansive tax exemptions and limited financial disclosure requirements, they can receive multi-million-dollar overseas grants without triggering the oversight mechanisms that apply to political or lobbying activity.

This is precisely why the Paris-Algiers halal monopoly deal is so relevant to the U.S.: the legal architecture already exists here for a foreign government to cultivate influence via mosque funding, then leverage that influence for political or economic gain, just as Algeria did in France.

Halal Certification Gatekeepers

Halal certification for exports to Gulf and other Muslim-majority markets is tightly controlled by a handful of U.S. bodies that appear on foreign governments’ official “approved certifier” lists.

For example, the Islamic Food and Nutrition Council of America (IFANCA) in Illinois is recognized by Malaysia’s Department of Islamic Development (JAKIM), Saudi Arabia’s Saudi Halal Center (SFDA/SASO), the UAE’s Ministry of Industry & Advanced Technology (MoIAT), Indonesia’s Halal Product Assurance Agency (BPJPH), and Singapore’s Islamic Religious Council (MUIS).

The Islamic Services of America (ISA) in Iowa also holds approvals from Gulf states and Malaysia, while other U.S. certifiers—such as the American Halal Foundation (AHF), Halal Transactions of Omaha (HTO), and the Halal Food Council USA (HFC-USA), are recognized for specific markets like Indonesia and Malaysia.

In each case, foreign governments decide which certifiers are “acceptable” for entry into their markets, granting them de facto monopolies over multi-million-dollar export sectors. That recognition power creates indirect leverage over U.S. halal agencies, making it possible—just as in France—for political loyalty or cooperation with a foreign government’s agenda to be rewarded with market exclusivity.

Political Advocacy from Religious Platforms

Although IRS rules prohibit political endorsements by tax-exempt organizations, enforcement is rare. Some religious leaders with foreign ties have openly praised or condemned U.S. politicians based on foreign policy alignment—particularly on issues involving Israel, Kashmir, or Middle Eastern conflicts. In immigrant-heavy districts, these endorsements can influence local election outcomes.

Precedents and Warning Signs in the U.S.

• 2016–2024: Several prominent U.S. mosques and Islamic centers—including in Texas, New York, and Illinois—have hosted foreign government representatives, including ambassadors and consuls, for events addressing issues such as Jerusalem’s status, sanctions policy, and Middle East conflicts. While these gatherings are framed as cultural or religious outreach, they also serve as venues for messaging aligned with the visiting government’s positions.
• 2020: U.S.-based halal certification companies, including the Islamic Food and Nutrition Council of America (IFANCA), appeared in federal lobbying disclosures and government partnership records connected to international trade access and halal standard recognition with Gulf states, highlighting the overlap between religious certification and foreign trade policy.
• Ongoing: State and local governments—including in Minnesota, California, and New Jersey—have been pressed by mosque-linked advocacy groups to adopt resolutions on foreign policy issues, such as Gaza ceasefires and condemnations of foreign governments. While not always coordinated directly by a foreign state, these campaigns often mirror narratives promoted by those governments in international forums.

The Cost of Inaction

France’s experience shows how swiftly a foreign government can turn a domestic religious institution into a political and economic proxy. Once entrenched, such arrangements are hard to dismantle without risking diplomatic retaliation, and can have influence on domestic policy, even to the destruction of local laws and constitutions, as in France.

In the U.S., the absence of a foreign religious influence registry, coupled with weak nonprofit political-activity enforcement, leaves the door wide open. Federal agencies have no mechanism to determine whether a religious leader’s endorsement is independent—or delivered at the suggestion of a foreign head of state in exchange for an economic concession.

The Next Steps America Isn’t Taking

To prevent a “Grand Mosque” scenario on U.S. soil, policymakers should:

• Require full disclosure of all foreign funding to U.S.-based religious organizations.
• Audit halal and kosher certification monopolies for foreign-government influence.
• Strengthen IRS enforcement of political activity bans for tax-exempt entities.
• Investigate quid pro quo risks linking religious endorsements to government favors.

France is living with the fallout of allowing a foreign capital to influence who leads one of its most important religious institutions—and what that leader tells millions of voters. The United States can either treat this as a warning or learn the hard way that the same playbook works just as well in Washington as it does in Paris.

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