It’s more than fuel: Why the Space Force needs in-space servicing, assembly, and manufacturing

It is in the best interest of the Space Force to embrace and actively pursue a future objective architecture founded in on-orbit logistics — the replacement of expendable commodities like fuel and the upgrade of hardware and software components. The ability to sustain, upgrade, and modify on-orbit capabilities through in-space servicing, assembly, and manufacturing (ISAM) may prove to be as decisive in future space conflicts as logistics has proven to be in every other domain of warfare throughout history.

Achieving and maintaining space superiority in future conflicts will go to the side that can maneuver the best, adapt the fastest, and sustain combat operations the longest. China is determined to replace the United States as Earth’s leading space power, and is fielding operational space systems, counterspace weapons, and a logistics capability to do just that. We often discuss the first two capabilities, but the third is just as important.

The recent deluge of Chinese on-orbit activities speaks volumes about the priority they place on space and the role of maneuver — the ability to reposition or reorient a satellite.

They are rapidly expanding their space systems, while also pursuing methods to sustain the maneuverability and operations of their satellites. They have even demonstrated the repositioning of a dead satellite via SJ 21 to an alternate orbit. China is also rapidly investing in technology to refuel and service existing satellites, which would radically enhance satellite operational utility. This isn’t theoretical — reports suggest China’s SJ-25 may have already conducted a refueling of the SJ-21. This further enables China to practice orbital warfare, or space dog-fighting, as they’ve already demonstrated with five satellites simultaneously engaging in operations against one another.

Meanwhile, the Space Force is transforming its architecture to adapt to the realities of space now being a warfighting domain. This transformation includes a dramatic shift from “big, juicy targets” in geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) to a more resilient proliferated low Earth orbit (pLEO). However, the Space Force also recognizes the unique benefits of GEO and that the consequences of losing superiority there are too significant to abandon. As a result, they are rightly pursuing a hybrid architecture, but it is unclear if that hybrid architecture will include in-space logistics through ISAM. The realities of future space operations demand pursuing this course.

The recent Government Accounting Office (GAO) report on ISAM provided several options for the nation, from maintaining the status quo to identifying a champion within the government to lead ISAM efforts. However, the GAO report falls short because it does not identify how ISAM benefits — including flexibility, operational longevity, relocation, mission optimization, and decreased cost — could fundamentally transform the nature of military space operations.

In the same way that air-to-air refueling transformed aerial combat operations, ISAM can advance military space operations, and likely to an even greater degree. On-orbit refueling is a key first step in ISAM capabilities, but it is not the only aspect that could have a monumental change to Space Force and US Space Command operations. The ability to swap out components, to upgrade elements, add mission enhancements or changes, and add resilience or countermeasures can all help defend valuable GEO assets and locations from adversary action.

Cumulatively, ISAM will help sustain ongoing combat operations in space indefinitely and increase the flexibility of the USSF on-orbit architecture, ultimately enabling US Space Command to create multiple compounding dilemmas for future adversaries. These include frequent maneuvers or even non-Keplerian trajectories to confound adversary surveillance of spacecraft with dynamically changing missions and capabilities.

Further, it enables the United States to advantageously position forces in mass to conduct offensive and defensive missions that allow for some level of attrition, either through natural events or adversary action. Finally, it will enable the United States to have the staying power to maintain space superiority in a prolonged conflict with China.

The Space Force’s Space Warfighting: A Framework for Planners highlights movement and maneuver as enduring principles of warfare; however, it left open the question of how they might achieve it. One school of thought is rapidly fielded “disposable” systems frequently replaced like the pLEO approach. But for objects in GEO, atmospheric re-entry is not an option. “Disposable” satellites would result in mass debris fields beyond or below the GEO belt.

Further, this approach will stress supply chains and materials for short-lived systems, when some components of these systems are disposed while still operationally viable. A better approach is to swap components and replenish expendables, like fuel and weapons, while continuing to leverage existing subsystems and buses.

But transformation on the scale needed will take time to emplace the hardware and refine the concepts of operation. And time is currently not on the United States’ side. China is moving forward at breathtaking pace, and if the United States wishes to maintain space superiority, it must do so quickly. It must act boldly and decisively now to take the steps necessary for a logistics-based future architecture.

Maintaining a “wait and see” approach only cedes time to China — that we will never get back.

Charles Galbreath is a retired United States Space Force Colonel, a Command Space Operator with expertise in Missile Warning, Space Control, Space Launch, and ICBM operations, and a Senior Materiel Leader with experience developing advanced technology demonstration and prototype systems. He is a Senior Resident Fellow for Space Studies at the Mitchell Institute.