Reunification of the Aleutians: A strategic proposal for the Commander Islands

In 1867, Secretary of State William H. Seward’s purchase of Alaska was criticized as “Seward’s Folly.” Today, Alaska remains a cornerstone of the United States’ energy and defense strategy.

Now, the United States faces a similarly transformative opportunity, one that could strengthen Arctic security, reunite a divided Indigenous people, and reaffirm American leadership in a rapidly evolving region. The proposal is that the United States pursue the peaceful and pragmatic purchase of the Commander Islands from the Russian Federation for $15 billion, in order to monitor potential Chinese submarine activity attempting to enter the Arctic Ocean.

This initiative reflects strategic anticipation grounded in geopolitical realism, unity, and the securing of the Arctic’s future. Yet despite the inherent complexities, a carefully structured agreement could yield mutual benefits for both Washington, DC and Moscow.

The Commander Islands lie at the far western end of the Aleutian chain, where the North Pacific meets the Bering Sea. Comprising Bering Island and Medny Island, this remote archipelago is home to around 676 residents, divided roughly evenly between Russians and Aleuts. It is known for its rich biodiversity, cultural heritage, and pristine marine environment. Positioned at the maritime crossroads between North America and Asia, the islands are gaining growing geopolitical significance as Arctic shipping routes expand and regional powers, such as China, increase their presence and interest in the North Pacific and Arctic.

China has declared itself a “near-Arctic state.” While developing its “Polar Silk Road,” it has invested heavily in Arctic infrastructure, scientific research, and dual-use maritime capabilities. While its activities are currently peaceful and research-oriented, the dual-use nature of many of these investments, combined with China’s expanding blue-water navy, raises important questions about future intentions.

From its Jianggezhuang Naval Base near Qingdao, China’s Jin- and Tang-class submarines could theoretically transit the Bering Strait and operate beneath Arctic ice, where detection is difficult. Armed with JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, they could threaten US cities like New York and Washington, DC, from Arctic waters, which are well within the missile’s 10,000+ kilometer range. If these submarines reached the Atlantic, launch warning time could drop below 15 minutes, complicating US response options.

Though hypothetical, this scenario reflects real trends. China’s naval modernization and Arctic ambitions suggest the region may become a future corridor for undersea deterrence and power projection.

The Commander Islands are situated directly along the potential route from China’s Jianggezhuang Naval Base to the Arctic. Their location is strategic and geographically pivotal for monitoring undersea activity. These islands represent one of the few viable chokepoints combined with the existing United States Aleutian Islands, where the United States could monitor, track, and deter submarine activity entering the Arctic basin. Combining the United States Aleutian Islands with the Commander Islands could create an Aleutian sonar shield defending the Bering Sea from undetected entry.

The proposed $15 billion acquisition of the Commander Islands and their surrounding Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) could follow international legal frameworks, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Although the United States has not ratified UNCLOS, it adheres to its key provisions as customary international law. US maritime operations already align with UNCLOS principles, including EEZ rights and freedom of navigation. Structuring the transaction accordingly would reinforce the United States’ commitment to a rules-based order and ensure legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.

The EEZ of this purchase would account for approximately 431,014 square kilometers, roughly the size of California, directly in the middle of China’s submarine route into the Arctic. This would expand the US EEZ by 3.8 percent and make the existing United States Aleutian Island Chain EEZ contiguous, thus allowing for persistent surveillance. The proposed valuation is structured as follows: $6.5 billion for the EZZ, $4 billion for Natural Resources associated with the area, $2.5 billion for Biodiversity and Conservation Value, and $2 billion for infrastructure. This proposal would signal a long-term vision of generating a mutually beneficial path forward in a rapidly developing Arctic landscape.

By acquiring the Commander Islands, the United States would gain an essential location for deploying advanced undersea surveillance technologies, including the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS), seabed-mounted sonar arrays, and satellite-integrated radar systems. This directly supports the objectives outlined in Section 18 of the April 2025 Executive Order on Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance, which mandates the development of a strategy to secure Arctic waterways and ensure American prosperity amid evolving security challenges.

A key geophysical advantage of the Commander Islands lies in their comparatively moderate ice accumulation compared to more northerly Arctic islands. This environmental characteristic is strategically significant: heavy ice buildup can scatter or absorb sonar signals, degrading acoustic fidelity and reducing detection accuracy. Moreover, dynamic ice movement generates ambient underwater noise, complicating the identification of submarine signatures. The Commander Islands’ more stable acoustic environment offers a superior location for continuous, high-resolution undersea monitoring.

Russian Concerns

Of course, there are two potential issues with such a deal: America’s allies, and Russia itself.

Such a transaction would inevitably raise concerns among US allies, especially if the war in Ukraine remains unresolved. A large financial infusion into Russia’s economy could be seen as indirectly supporting its military, potentially weakening Western unity and sanctions. To address this, the deal could include strict conditionality and transparency, with funds disbursed in phases, tied to verifiable commitments to peaceful reinvestment in infrastructure, conservation, or humanitarian aid.

Framing the purchase within a broader diplomatic initiative, with multilateral oversight and reaffirmed NATO solidarity, would help align it with US values and global commitments. By embedding the transaction in a rules-based framework, the United States can responsibly advance its Arctic strategy, anchored by the strategic acquisition of the Commander Islands.

However, Russia may hesitate to sell the Commander Islands due to their strategic location near the Bering Strait and symbolic value tied to national pride and territorial integrity. The islands are also part of a designated biosphere reserve, which is valued for its ecological and scientific significance.

Their proximity to Russia’s Pacific Fleet bases in Kamchatka raises concerns about ceding surveillance ground to a rival. Yet this same proximity could make the sale acceptable. Compared to fortified Kamchatka, the islands offer limited military utility. Their remoteness, sparse population, and lack of infrastructure render them more symbolic than operational in Russia’s defense posture.

Furthermore, by transferring the islands, Russia could subtly complicate China’s strategic calculus in the Arctic without directly confronting Beijing. This would allow Moscow to recalibrate the regional balance in favor of a multipolar Arctic, one where no single non-Arctic power dominates while extracting significant economic value and potentially resetting diplomatic channels with the West.

Additionally, there are compelling reasons Russia might see an advantage in such a transaction. The Commander Islands, while strategically located, are remote and sparsely populated. Their economic output is minimal, and maintaining infrastructure and services imposes a cost with limited return. A $15 billion offer represents a significant financial opportunity that could be reinvested into domestic priorities and infrastructure.

This proposal is also about the Aleut people, who once moved freely across the Aleutian chain. Since 1867, they’ve been divided by international borders. Of the roughly 15,350 Aleuts, over 15,000 live in the US, while about 350 remain on Bering Island — the only populated Commander Island. This purchase would reunite them under one national framework for the first time in over 150 years, aligning with the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), in particular Article 36, which states: “Indigenous people, in particular those divided by international borders, have the right to maintain and develop contacts, relations, and cooperation, including activities for spirituality, cultural, political, economic, and social purposes, with their members as well as other people across borders.”

Reunification would restore cultural continuity, empower Aleut governance, and expand opportunity. The islands could be incorporated into Alaska or designated a United States unincorporated territory similar to American Samoa or Guam, allowing for tailored governance that prioritizes Indigenous self-determination.

Integration into the United States would bring access to modern infrastructure, healthcare, and education. Residents could benefit from federal programs such as Medicaid, rural broadband expansion, tribal economic development grants, and higher education scholarships. These are not abstract benefits; they are life-changing opportunities for a community that has long been separated from itself.

This is a moment to act with vision and resolve. The Commander Islands are more than remote outposts; they are keys to Arctic security, symbols of unity, and beacons of hope for divided communities. Let us begin the dialogue and shape the future of the Arctic.

Lt. Col. Jeffery M. Fritz is an Armor officer with duty in Estonia, assigned to the United States Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC). The views expressed in this article are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the United States Army.