Credible prompt strike: How hypersonic weapons could transform Pacific deterrence

This is the latest in a series of semi-regular columns by Robbin Laird, where he will tackle current defense issues through the lens of more than 45 years of defense expertise in both the US and abroad. The goal of these columns: to look back at how questions and perspectives of the past should inform decisions being made today.

The United States stands at a critical juncture in hypersonic weapons development. After years of bureaucratic delays and shifting priorities, the Air Force has two tactical hypersonic systems moving closer to deployment, each of which could fundamentally change the strategic calculus in the Pacific theater.

Yet the question remains: Will America seize this moment, or allow further delays to erode its competitive edge?

Hypersonic weapons represent a critical enabler for the distributed force strategy currently being implemented by Indo-Pacific Command. As military planners grapple with the challenge of deterring Chinese aggression while maintaining presence across vast Pacific distances, prompt strike capabilities become essential.

“If I can take a weapon that does everything that a Tomahawk does, same range, same package, but instead of flying at Mach 0.7 it flies at Mach 7, why wouldn’t I want that?” Dr. Mark Lewis, my former colleague when we both worked for Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne and a leading expert in hypersonics, explained during a recent discussion with him on hypersonic deployment strategy. “But of course, I might not be able to have the speed and retain all the same performance, so I need to consider the engineering tradeoffs.”

The strategic logic is compelling. China’s primary advantage lies in its ability to mass forces quickly before the United States can effectively distribute and position its assets. Hypersonic weapons deployed throughout the Pacific theater complicate Chinese planning by threatening rapid strikes against advancing naval forces, buying crucial time for American and allied forces to achieve optimal positioning.

A recent DOT&E report argued that there wasn’t enough information “to confidently assess operational effectiveness, lethality, suitability and survivability” of the Air Force efforts. While the DOT&E’s caution is understandable, strategic realities necessitate a parallel track: Cautious validation must evolve hand-in-hand with rapid, iterative fielding to maintain US technological and deterrent leadership. The challenge for policymakers is to ensure that prudence in testing does not translate into strategic hesitation.

It could be put like this: Keeping hypersonic missiles in the phase of a science project will not deter the Chinese. While rigorous testing is vital, extended delays may undercut deterrence and embolden opponents who are already fielding or demonstrating similar systems.

The Air Force now has two weapons that Lewis believes are very close to readiness for deployment. The ARRW (Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon), a tactical boost-glide system developed by Lockheed Martin, has not only passed its tests but exceeded initial expectations. The weapon can be mounted on B-52 bombers, with four missiles per aircraft.

The USAF can complement ARRW with the HACM (Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile) an air-breathing cruise missile developed by Raytheon with Northrop Grumman providing the scramjet engine. This system offers exceptional packaging advantages, able to integrate with multiple aircraft including F-15s and strategic bombers. A B-2 might carry as many as 15 hypersonic cruise missiles, while a B-52 could carry even more.

Despite the maturing technology, the path to deployment on these systems has been frustratingly circuitous. In January 2020, the Pentagon’s hypersonic acceleration plan received overwhelming support, with the plan ultimately targeted to receive significant funding with unified support across the services.

However, the change in administration brought new skepticism. Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall questioned the need for hypersonic weapons, arguing that existing systems could perform the same missions and that Chinese target sets differed from American requirements. This perspective ignored fundamental realities about speed, survivability, and strategic timing.

“In some ways we seem to have fallen further behind our adversaries than we were four years previously,” Lewis said about the impact of these delays. “We had lost ground because of this dithering.”

The recent reversal of this position offers hope. The Air Force has now publicly committed to ARRW deployment, though specific timelines remain unclear. This decision reflects growing recognition that hypersonic capabilities cannot remain perpetually in development while adversaries’ field operational systems.

Current Chinese advantages stem partly from the perception that their systems, regardless of actual effectiveness, represent deployed threats. American hypersonic weapons must transition from laboratory curiosities to operational realities to achieve similar psychological impact. From a deterrent point of view, if they’re out there with B-2s and other systems, the Chinese have a really difficult situation.

Deterrence requires credible, visible capabilities. Weapons systems confined to test ranges and development programs do not influence adversary calculations. Deployed systems, operated by trained crews and integrated into operational planning, send unmistakable signals about American resolve and capability.

The immediate priority should be accelerating deployment of existing systems rather than pursuing perfect solutions. Both ARRW and HACM represent mature technologies ready for operational use. Initial deployments will provide valuable operational experience while demonstrating American commitment to maintaining Pacific security. The point is that you need to put them in the hands of the “fight tonight force” to get the deployment experience which will drive further realistic development of these cutting-edge strike systems.

This approach aligns with broader strategic imperatives. As military planners focus on the “fight tonight” force rather than distant future capabilities, hypersonic weapons offer immediate enhancement of existing strategies. They complement distributed operations, provide prompt strike options, and demonstrate allied solidarity.

Speaking of allies — the hypersonic program’s international dimension offers additional strategic advantages. Cooperation with Australia through the SCIF (Strategic Capabilities International Framework) program has demonstrated allied interest in these capabilities. Australian F/A-18s could potentially carry hypersonic weapons, while future integration with F-35s would enable broader coalition participation.

In addition, Northrop Grumman is collaborating with the Japanese Ministry of Defense on the development and future deployment of advanced hypersonic defense technology. The cornerstone of this partnership is the co-development of the Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI), a missile defense system designed to detect, track, and intercept hypersonic missiles during the glide phase of their flight, before they reenter the atmosphere or strike targets.

This coalition approach serves multiple purposes. It provides additional deployment platforms and signals unified allied commitment to Pacific security. More importantly, it complicates Chinese planning by creating multiple launch points throughout the region.

The window for effective deterrence may be narrowing. Chinese military modernization continues at pace, while American advantage in key technologies risks erosion through inaction. The tools for maintaining Pacific stability exist today, ready for deployment. The question is whether institutional momentum can overcome bureaucratic inertia to deliver these capabilities when they matter most.

Success requires more than technical achievement — it demands operational deployment, allied integration, and strategic communication that hypersonic weapons represent not just American technological prowess, but unwavering commitment to Pacific security. The weapons are ready. The strategy is clear. What remains is the will to act.