USAID Sent Deadly Viruses to Fauci’s Wuhan Lab

Written by Jonathan Harper.

A startling revelation has emerged, implicating the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in the transfer of thousands of dangerous viral samples to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), a facility with known ties to the Chinese military. This decade-long operation, conducted without formal oversight or agreements, has intensified scrutiny over U.S. involvement in high-risk biological research and its potential implications for global health security. The following analysis explores the details of this program, its shortcomings, and the broader consequences for biosafety and international relations.

The USAID PREDICT Program and Viral Transfers

Over the course of ten years, USAID’s PREDICT program facilitated the collection and transfer of approximately 11,000 viral samples to the WIV, a laboratory in Wuhan, China, notorious for its role in the COVID-19 pandemic. Launched with a $210 million budget, PREDICT aimed to identify and monitor emerging infectious diseases by gathering pathogens from various global regions, including China’s Yunnan province, a known hotspot for zoonotic viruses. The program, led by the University of California-Davis, operated without a long-term strategy for securely storing or accessing these samples, raising significant concerns about their potential misuse.

The transferred viruses included a close relative of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, which caused the global COVID-19 outbreak. This connection has fueled speculation about the origins of the pandemic and the role of U.S.-funded research in amplifying biological risks. The absence of contractual stipulations requiring sample storage in U.S. facilities or shared access for American researchers compounded the program’s vulnerabilities. Such oversights have led experts to question the prudence of entrusting sensitive materials to a facility with questionable biosafety practices and affiliations with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

The WIV’s history of inadequate biosecurity measures is well-documented. Reports from 2018 highlighted concerns from U.S. diplomats about the lab’s lax safety protocols, including insufficiently trained staff and outdated infrastructure. Despite these red flags, USAID continued to fund the transfer of high-risk pathogens, a decision that critics argue reflects a troubling lack of foresight and accountability.

Implications for Biosecurity and U.S. Policy

The revelation of USAID’s involvement in sending viral samples to the WIV has reignited debates about the ethics and risks of gain-of-function research, which involves manipulating pathogens to enhance their transmissibility or lethality. Such experiments, often conducted to understand viral behavior, carry inherent dangers, particularly when performed in facilities with suboptimal safety standards. The WIV’s military connections further complicate the issue, as they raise the possibility that transferred samples could have been repurposed for bioweapons development, a scenario that alarms biosecurity experts.

The PREDICT program’s failure to establish robust safeguards has drawn sharp criticism from the scientific community. Molecular biologist Richard Ebright emphasized that the program should have mandated the transfer of all samples—or at least copies—to U.S. government facilities for secure storage. The absence of such measures left the U.S. without control over potentially dangerous materials, undermining national security and scientific integrity. This oversight is particularly egregious given the program’s substantial funding, which was intended to mitigate, not exacerbate, global health risks.

The broader context of U.S.-China scientific collaboration adds another layer of complexity. While international partnerships are essential for addressing global health challenges, they require stringent oversight to prevent misuse of shared resources. The WIV’s opaque operations and its ties to the PLA have long been a point of contention, with U.S. intelligence agencies warning about the risks of dual-use research—studies with both civilian and military applications. The USAID program’s lack of transparency has thus amplified calls for stricter regulations governing cross-border biological research.

Recent developments have brought renewed focus on USAID’s operations. In 2025, the agency was dismantled following an investigation by President Donald Trump’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), which uncovered widespread inefficiencies and misuse of taxpayer funds. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio criticized USAID’s track record, noting that its development initiatives often failed to achieve their objectives while fostering anti-American sentiment abroad. The closure of USAID marks a significant shift in U.S. foreign aid policy, with implications for future global health programs.

Public and Political Reactions

The disclosure of USAID’s role in the WIV transfers has sparked outrage among policymakers and the public, particularly in light of the COVID-19 pandemic’s devastating impact. The transfer of a SARS-CoV-2-related virus to Wuhan has intensified suspicions about the pandemic’s origins, with some speculating that U.S.-funded research may have inadvertently contributed to the outbreak. While no conclusive evidence supports this claim, the lack of transparency surrounding the PREDICT program has eroded public trust in federal institutions.

Critics have pointed to Anthony Fauci, former director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, as a central figure in the controversy. Fauci’s oversight of U.S. funding for WIV research, including through subgrants from the National Institutes of Health, has been a lightning rod for criticism. Although Fauci has defended the research as essential for pandemic preparedness, the absence of adequate safeguards in the USAID program has undermined his arguments, prompting demands for greater accountability.

The political fallout has been swift. Congressional hearings are underway to investigate USAID’s funding practices and their implications for national security. Lawmakers from both parties have called for a comprehensive review of U.S.-funded biological research abroad, with a focus on ensuring that such programs do not inadvertently bolster adversarial capabilities. The Trump administration’s decision to terminate USAID reflects a broader push to curb federal programs perceived as wasteful or risky, a stance that resonates with voters concerned about government overreach.

Public sentiment, shaped by years of pandemic-related hardship, remains deeply skeptical. Social media platforms have seen an outpouring of frustration, with users questioning why U.S. taxpayer dollars were used to fund research in a country with a history of obfuscating health crises. This backlash underscores the need for clear communication and robust oversight to restore confidence in scientific endeavors funded by the government.

Our Take

The transfer of thousands of viral samples to the Wuhan Institute of Virology under USAID’s PREDICT program represents a grave misstep in U.S. biosecurity policy. The program’s failure to implement basic safeguards, coupled with the WIV’s military affiliations and poor safety record, has rightly sparked alarm about the risks of unchecked international research collaborations. While the pursuit of global health security is a worthy goal, it must not come at the expense of national security or public trust. The dismantling of USAID signals a necessary reckoning with the agency’s inefficiencies, but it should also prompt a broader reevaluation of how the U.S. funds and oversees high-risk biological research. Moving forward, policymakers must prioritize transparency, rigorous oversight, and secure storage protocols to prevent similar lapses and safeguard against future pandemics.