The case against a Pacific defense pact

In a Foreign Affairs op-ed, Ely Ratner outlines a case for a Pacific Defense Pact. Although applying collective defense to Asia is a novel idea, Ratner’s proposal will dangerously accelerate U.S.-China competition, enflame regional tensions, and fail to deter China.

Defense Into Offense

The geopolitical balance in the Indo-Pacific is delicate; as Ratner outlines, Taiwan, the South and East China Seas, and the U.S.-China rivalry are all potential hotspots for escalation. Rather than resolve these conflict points, collective defense primes these hotspots for increased Chinese aggression. China will perceive the Pacific Defense Pact as a continuation of Washington’s containment strategies. The collective defense arrangement entails military investments, exercises, and operations, as well as increased deterrence and the deployment of “advanced capabilities,” which each invite a reciprocal escalatory response from Beijing.

The Pacific Defense Pact relies on the faulty assumption that Washington’s formal alliances deter Beijing. Ratner even highlights the dangers of escalation stemming from China’s naval harassment of Japan, the Philippines, and Australia. Despite robust alliance commitments, these countries face Chinese aggression. Washington’s security pledge to Tokyo over the islands unnecessarily entangles the U.S. into a Sino-Japanese territorial dispute, fuels conflict between China and Japan, and prompts retaliation from Beijing. This similar flaw in US-led regional deterrence strategies applies to the Philippines and Australia. As Washington encircles China through the U.S.-Philippines alliance and AUKUS (the United Kingdom-Australia-American security partnership), alliance-based containment of China is likely to increase maritime aggression and accelerate U.S.-China competition.

China will likely initiate regional trade disputes in response to the new pact. China maintains a robust regional trade presence with Japan, the Philippines, and Australia. In uniting against Beijing as pawns for American aggression, these three countries will feel economic pressure from Beijing. China has a track record of economic coercion: in response to Seoul’s cooperation with the US over missile defense, Beijing targeted South Korean firms. China could escalate economic coercion in response to the new defense pact, potentially upending regional trade dynamics. Decreased trade between countries will increase the probability of conflict as nations lack an economic incentive to maintain linkages and diplomatic relations.

The “Frail Four”

Genuine military partnerships amongst the “core four” will be unlikely. Washington’s “hub and spoke” system relies on bilateral partnerships rather than multilateral alliances. Regional dynamics can constrain the effectiveness of the Pacific Defense Pact, such as similar issues that may arise from the hypothetical creation of an Asian NATO. Generally, allies in the Indo-Pacific prefer flexible approaches that avoid locking in formal commitments. This approach enables nations to strategically adapt to the complexities of Indo-Pacific security and support allies without becoming entangled in distant conflicts.

Australia’s opposition to a formal security commitment to the Philippines will prevent the formulation of the regional defense pact. To formalize the pact, Canberra must incur the cost of defending the Philippines, which are geographically distant. Furthermore, Australia would never extend a credible security guarantee to Manila. Australia has already provided humanitarian support and cooperated via joint military programs with the Philippines. However, Canberra would oppose military technology transfers to the Philippines. A defense pact with Manila does not provide Canberra any strategic or political benefit. In a 2024 Lowy Institute Poll, Australians did not consider the Philippines to be essential for defense relations, even ranking France above the Philippines as a potentially closer security partner. Australia is content with the status quo, where the QUAD (Australia, India, Japan, and the US) allows for flexible alignment with its allies. Canberra is unlikely to risk a shift from the current structure of a bilateral defense pact with the U.S. and quadrilateral alliance.

Japan’s participation in the Pacific Defense Pact adds complications. The Japanese Constitution restricts Tokyo’s ability to engage in collective defense and re-militarize. Unless there is an armed attack against an ally that also threatens Japan or Japanese nationals, the ability of Japan to qualify for collective self-defense is limited. Domestic debates over Japan’s security posture and collective defense have triggered political firestorms, which could tank Tokyo’s bid to join a formalized Indo-Pacific defense agreement. Former Prime Minister Abe’s re-interpretation of Article 9 under extremely limited conditions was highly divisive. Ratner’s proposal allows Japan to invoke collective defense across the Indo-Pacific without strict activation requirements, which would cause extreme political backlash.

Even under the assumption that Canberra, Tokyo, Manila, and Washington could reach a consensus, the “core four” is insufficient to deter China. Despite a unified stance on collective defense against China, Beijing continues harassment of regional actors. For collective defense to even attempt to deter China, the defense pact must include a broad range of actors. The Pacific “core four” is analogous to a NATO that only consists of the U.S., Spain, Bulgaria, and Romania, which would be woefully inadequate for engaging in meaningful collective defense operations. Credible security assurances are foundational to alliances, yet there are logical leaps in Ratner’s proposal. His argument assumes the “core four” will unequivocally support each other against China. The collective defense agreement is unlikely to reach a cohesive red line. Thus, the potential success of Ratner’s recommendation relies on the additional inclusion of additional countries, such as South Korea, New Zealand, India, and Singapore.

Too Many Cooks Spoil Collective Defense

Each added member to the new defense pact raises challenges and turns the security arrangement into a bloated, ineffective alliance. Each potential member-state has a plethora of political, economic, and international challenges that constrain its ability to commit to collective defense. South Korea and Japan’s historically contentious relationship amplifies these regional challenges to successful collective self-defense. South Korea’s termination of the GSOMIA (General Security of Military Information Agreement) demonstrates the fragility of military agreements. In response to trade disputes with Japan, Seoul ended the deal in 2019. Although South Korea resumed the agreement in 2023, fundamental disagreements over Japan’s past colonization of Korea could lead to the agreement collapsing in the future. Increasing Tokyo’s military capabilities through investments in military facilities and weapons stockpiles is likely to frighten Seoul (and Beijing).

Despite security concerns, the region’s relationship with Beijing is complex and includes support for closer ties. India’s diplomatic relationship with China is improving – both governments have met to build bilateral ties amidst border disputes. Singapore favors cooperative approaches between the West and Beijing. New Zealand is deepening ties, especially economic relations, with China. Joining a Pacific Defense Pact would complicate these countries warming relationships with China, which could hinder commitment to collective defense.

If the Pacific Defense Pact managed to rally the “core four” and additional members, then the collective defense pact would be an anti-China bloc. In response, a pro-China bloc may form in the Indo-Pacific. Southeast Asian nations aim to avoid the binary choice between the U.S. and its allies versus China. A collective defense proposal may force the hand of Southeast Asia, where these countries are prioritizing economic growth and seeking to avoid Beijing’s coercion. The concept of collective defense presumes a geopolitical binary: US allies versus China. Regional actors oppose this Manichean mindset and prefer an approach that assumes the geopolitical nuances of the region.

Commitment Problems

Applying collective defense to Asia will bring along the baggage associated with traditional alliances. The backing of the Pacific Defense Pact could create moral hazards, where Manila feels emboldened to engage in risky behavior because the Philippines has the support of the entire collective defense group. Concerns of an emboldened Manila are particularly concerning given the trend of illiberal leaders presiding over the Philippines. Former president Duterte brashly declared military confrontation against any party who wanted control over the disputed Scarborough Shoals in the South China Sea. Military support behind Manila could entangle members of the collective defense agreement into military confrontations over seemingly insignificant rocks.

Reducing conflict between allies and adversaries relies on credible deterrence. However, multilateral alliances can struggle to deter adversaries credibly. Ratner’s assessment of Chinese strategy amplifies this concern, arguing how Beijing will use disinformation tactics and coercion. Rather than resorting to military conflict, Beijing will employ gray zone operations to test the collective defense agreement. China’s approach against the U.S. and its allies will likely stay below the threshold of direct aggression. Beijing’s gray zone operations will hinder the credibility of the Pacific Defense Pact. Allies are unwilling to respond to gray zone operations, allowing China to further encroach on allied territories. Beijing has a history of naval harassment, disinformation campaigns, and cyberattacks. In response to collective defense, Beijing will intensify these activities and force the alliance to draw red lines. Then, China will maintain aggression below that threshold and decrease the morale and credibility of the new defense relationships.

Conclusion

The U.S. should resist the temptation to deter China by transplanting Cold War-era multilateral alliance structures to the Indo-Pacific. Although a bold idea, Ratner’s proposal will incite disproportionate retaliation by Beijing, turning the Indo-Pacific into a conflict tinderbox. Washington’s influence in regional matters will only escalate hotspots. Rather than rigid, outdated collective defense architecture, Asia needs an American foreign policy that acknowledges the region’s complexity and emphasizes cultural, economic, and diplomatic connections between the East and West. Encircling China under the guise of “defense” will only continue America’s ineffective foreign policy in the region.

Jimin Park is a graduate student at Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service in Asian Studies. He holds a B.A. in Global & International Studies and a B.A. Political Science from the University of Kansas.