Four steps to creating a National Defense Strategy built on strength

The new Pentagon leadership has set itself up to potentially oversee fundamental changes that could dramatically improve military warfighting capabilities for decades to come. In addition to realigning the defense budget, organizational structures, and acquisition policies to support warfighters, key decisions are still pending on how and where America will defend its security and prosperity.

As detailed in a recent American Enterprise Institute working paper, there are steps that the Pentagon should take to position and posture its forces in order to best accomplish the president’s objective of Peace through Strength.

This working paper, loosely based upon the board game of Risk, outlines four areas the secretary of defense should prioritize as he develops the National Defense Strategy: the need for alliances; the importance of strategic terrain; the role of strategic enablers; and the need for sufficient and well-positioned forces to project power, deter aggression, and respond in a crisis.

Simply put, the defense strategy should be based upon strength and not an assumption of poverty. Here’s how these categories break down in real terms.

The need for alliances: Alliances need to be pursued for pragmatic reasons while always ensuring that the United States can act independently. America should support nations that are fighting against adversaries who clearly intend to diminish the position and strength of the United States.

No clearer example of such a situation exists than Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.

The military forces Russia has lost (and continues to lose) directly reduce their future threat. A strong, victorious Ukraine, allied with the United States, would mean that key terrain, rich in minerals and agriculture, remains out of Russian hands. At the same time, Russia’s allies in China, North Korea, and Iran would have an important warning about America’s resolve.

As the United States evaluates the nature and condition of burden sharing with its allies and partners, it must remember that one-size-fits-all doesn’t apply.

In the Pacific, for instance, Washington must remain acutely aware of the dilemma middle powers in Asia face, especially among those countries who would prefer to be Western leaning but are still economically reliant upon China.

In contrast, when it comes to Europe, where NATO allies have under-spent on defense for decades, America should use the right combination of pressure and incentives to encourage a rearmament that also builds American industrial strength.

The importance of strategic terrain: The possession of critical geographical locations during times of peace is a force multiplier in wartime. These terrains, whether they are chokepoints, high ground, or resource-rich areas, provide a nation with significant warfighting advantages. They enable the pre-positioning of forces, the establishment of robust supply lines, and the fortification of defenses long before any conflict arises.

To reap the benefits of strategic terrain, a nation does not necessarily need to control it or physically occupy it. Instead, a nation just needs the ability to use it and deny its benefits to adversaries.

The administration’s approach to Greenland and Panama should reflect this, by affirming and strengthening existing agreements and fully utilizing assets such as the space force base already in Greenland. To that end, the discussions about annexation, 51st State, and ownership should cease and instead, things like treaties, bases, and the recent Unified Command Plan changes should increase. If other sovereign nations fear ulterior motives, then the easy changes will not be so easy, and our defense will be compromised.

The role of strategic enablers: Shipbuilding, space, cyber, ground forces, and undersea infrastructure all combine to enable a global military force posture and presence that is in the right place, with the right equipment, at the right time to deter war — and, if necessary, to fight and win.

The Trump administration should provide strategic direction and funding for maritime stealth, uncrewed systems, attritable weapons, and new power projection capabilities.

At the same time, it will need to increase funding for shipbuilding and maintenance. The United States must develop capabilities that can respond to “cable-cutters” and to ships with stray anchors while also recognizing that much of the undersea infrastructure is provided by commercial companies.

United States space policy, strategy, and funding should prioritize accelerating innovation by leveraging the private sector. This means reducing unnecessary commercial space regulations and licensing requirements and leveraging commercial space for military missions. Additionally, the Pentagon should pursue more aggressive defensive and offensive cyber capabilities and make clear that artificial intelligence and unmanned systems are strategic assets.

Sufficient and well-positioned forces: Previous administrations have tried to replace current capacity with future capability advancements, convincing themselves that prioritizing modernization at the expense of force structure to save money was okay, because that smaller force would eventually be more capable once next-generation weapons entered service.

But the idea of “procurement holidays” or “divest-to-invest” was, and is, a false choice, and one that should be discarded. The new defense strategy should emphasize robust forward stationed forces, and more routine and unpredictable exercises.

In addition, the military should emphasize prepositioning equipment and supplies, including munitions and air defenses, around the globe. The Army should not be downsizing its footprint in Europe — instead it should be increasing its ability to project power into the region by building up its prepositioned stocks in Poland and other locations.

In encouraging partner nations to devote more resources to their own security, the United States must lead by example. The Cold War average of defense spending as a share of GDP (6.6 percent) was more than double what it is today. Funding America’s defense at 5 percent of GDP, aligned with Senator Roger Wicker’s plan, will enable this strategy.

America needs a new National Defense Strategy that is guided by a long-term vision, an awareness of the threat environment, and actionable program and resourcing guidance. The National Defense Strategy should not be “poverty informed.” The strategy should make clear that America is a strong, prosperous, global leader that understands and pursues its interests and prioritizes the effective and accountable use of public funds for its security.

Only in this manner will we achieve peace through strength.

Elaine McCusker is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. She previously served as the Pentagon’s acting undersecretary of defense (comptroller). Todd Harrison is a senior fellow at AEI. He previously worked as a senior executive in the defense industry and as an officer in the Air Force Reserves. Retired U.S. Army Maj. Gen. John G. Ferrari is a senior nonresident fellow at AEI. He previously served as a director of program analysis and evaluation for the service.