Garvan Walshe is a former national and international security policy adviser to the Conservative Party.
Traditionally, a peace conference takes place either as fighting begins to wind down, and involves representatives of the warring parties (like, for example the talks in Paris between the United States and Vietnam), or takes place after one side’s defeat and is used to impose terms on the vanquished, as in the Treaty of Versailles.
The Ukraine Peace Summit, held in Switzerland on 15 and 16 June, was neither. The war shows no signs of ending, and Russia, which wasn’t invited, trolled the summit by proposing its own terms for a ceasefire (not even a permanent peace agreement) that would require Kyiv to hand Moscow land the Russian army hasn’t been able to conquer in battle.
The Summit was an exercise in defining what would count as a legitimate outcome from the war, and its limited success betrays divisions in the international community and the West’s unwillingness to accept that, if Ukraine is to win and the principle that international borders should not be changed by force is to be upheld, Russia has to lose.
International divisions began with another country that wasn’t there (China) but continued in the room itself. Kenya argued that using the interest on frozen Russian assets to help Ukraine was theft, while Saudi Arabia, nominally still a Western ally, suggested the aggressor and victim would have to reach a compromise.
Of the ten points in Ukraine’s Peace Formula, only three of the lowest common denominator featured on the summit’s agenda: the security of nuclear power plants, guarantees for the transport of food across the Black Sea, and the exchange of prisoners. Fundamental issues, like holding Russia to account for its aggression, were dropped for lack of consensus.
There was better news from South America. Both far-left Gabriel Boric (Chile), and libertarian Javier Milei (Argentina) spoke up in favour of Ukraine, showing Russia’s attempt to speak for the “Global South” to be as empty as the USSR’s efforts to coopt the “Third World.”
Yet this is very clearly a Northern Hemisphere war. Apart from strong statements in support of Ukraine by the United States and Japan, the most powerful interventions were European. The major European powers expressed their strong support (albeit Italy unnecessarily thought to reiterate that we were not at war with Russia).
Alexander Stubb of Finland spoke of how his grandfather’s homeland had been stolen by Stalin’s Russia; Estonia’s Kaja Kallas went further: the Soviets deported her own mother to Siberia. The most poignant intervention came from president Salome Zourabichvili of Georgia, where upcoming elections in October may well be the last chance to prevent another Russian takeover.
Peace talks seldom shape the balance of power – they reflect it. In this war, where technology favours static defence, advances are to be made by attacking the enemy’s ability to supply their forces with ammunition and equipment. Outgunned troops retreat, as Russians did in 2022 in Kharkhiv, and as Ukrainians were forced to, though less dramatically, this spring.
But as Ukrainians found out last summer, a decisive blow will be hard to land. This will be a war of attrition until enough pressure can be brought upon one side and it is forced to collapse.
For Kyiv, this means being able to attack Russian supply, weapons manufacturing, and oil refining capacity. For Russia it means being able to deprive Ukraine of the electricity it needs for its arms industry (forcing it to divert limited supplies to keep the civilian population warm in winter), and of Western support.
The lesson for Western backers of Ukraine should be clear.
Lift restrictions on Ukrainian targeting of Russian bases, including glide bomb bases and supply infrastructure, with long-range Western weapons. Keep air defence ammunition flowing. Upgrade military industrial capacity to cope supporting Ukraine through a long war. Intensify economic pressure on Russia – the secondary sanctions announced on 14 June hit the rouble hard, stoking inflation.
This requires a mindset shift by important Western leaders, in particular in Germany and the United States. Peace negotiations are not a substitute for war, but a way to recognise its outcome. If that outcome recognises that Russia can invade its neighbours and get away with it we all, and not just Poland and the Baltic states, will find ourselves in a much more dangerous world.
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Author: Garvan Walshe
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