This article was originally published in Vol. 5 No. 2 of our print edition.
Romania’s Nicușor Dan Wins a Democracy in Ruins
Bucharest Mayor Nicușor Dan won Romania’s presidential run-off on 18 May, defeating George Simion, the candidate of the Alliance for the Unity of Romanians (AUR).1 The pro-EU, progressive candidate overturned a gap of more than 20 percentage points from the first round to defeat his right-wing nationalist, Eurosceptic rival in what was arguably the most controversial election in Romania’s post-communist history.
According to the final results, Dan secured 53.6 per cent of the vote, outperforming most polling predictions. Surveys published ahead of the run-off had indicated an extremely close race; for example, Atlas Intel projected Dan’s victory to fall within the margin of error, giving him 48.7 per cent versus Simion’s 47.8 per cent. Other pollsters, such as CURS and Sociopol, predicted that Simion would win with 52 and 53 per cent, respectively. Ultimately, however, the AUR candidate finished second with 46.4 per cent.2
Voter turnout reached a record high, with over 64 per cent of eligible Romanians—more than 11.6 million people—casting their ballots on 18 May. This marked an increase of over 10 percentage points, or approximately 2 million voters, compared to the first round. The surge was largely driven by two specific groups: diaspora voters and members of Romania’s Hungarian minority.3
According to official data, approximately 1.6 million diaspora votes were cast in the run-off—around 600,000 more than in the first round. Meanwhile, turnout among Romanian Hungarians rose dramatically, from significantly below the national average in the first round to over 620,000 votes cast in the run-off, representing more than 90 per cent of eligible voters within the community.4 Notably, these two groups were widely viewed as potential kingmakers ahead of the second round—a prediction that ultimately held true.
As the title of this article suggests, Romania’s presidential race was controversial on multiple levels. The most prominent and widely discussed element was the annulment of the original first-round results in December 2024.
Stolen Election
At the time, right-wing ultranationalist and political outsider Călin Georgescu won the first round with 22.9 per cent of the vote. He and the pro-EU liberal centre-right Save Romania Union (USR) candidate Elina Lasconi—who would later be replaced by Nicușor Dan for the May election—were set to face off in the run-off. Their success represented a major backlash against the governing coalition’s establishment parties, the National Liberal Party (PNL) and the Social Democratic Party (PSD), marking the first time since the regime change that neither party had a candidate in the second round.5
However, that outcome was quickly—though not conclusively—‘corrected’. Georgescu and Lasconi were scheduled to compete in the run-off on 8 December 2024, but on 6 December, the Constitutional Court of Romania annulled the results of the first round. The court cited Russian interference in the electoral process, specifically efforts to amplify Georgescu’s social media presence. The candidate had run a campaign sharply critical of the EU and NATO, pledging to reduce military aid to Ukraine.6
‘Ultra-nationalist Călin Georgescu benefited from a TikTok campaign that resembled Kremlin-run influence operations in Ukraine and Moldova, according to declassified Romanian intelligence documents. The files alleged that Moscow is targeting Romania as an enemy state through aggressive hybrid action’, Politico Brussels reported at the time. Further investigations revealed that Georgescu’s campaign had received up to €1 million in undeclared donations from third parties, despite his official declaration of zero campaign expenditure.7
The Constitutional Court’s decision immediately plunged the country into the deepest political crisis of its post-communist era. The annulment was sharply criticized not only by Georgescu but also by his opponent Lasconi. ‘Today is the moment when the Romanian state trampled over democracy. God, the Romanian people, the truth, and the law will prevail and will punish those who are guilty of destroying our democracy’, she declared. Many observers noted that the declassified documents cited as evidence did not contain any concrete proof of Russian interference.8
The developments in Romania appeared to align perfectly with the broader struggle between mainstream and patriotic, sovereigntist forces—both in Europe and across the Atlantic—often characterized by the former’s use of politically motivated legal proceedings to suppress the latter. The cases of Donald Trump, Matteo Salvini, Marine Le Pen, Milorad Dodik, and the actions of Donald Tusk under the guise of ‘restoring the rule of law’ in Poland all bear striking resemblance to the annulment.9
‘Romania’s presidential race was controversial on multiple levels’
Adding to this mainstream-versus-patriotic dynamic, both EU and US leadership under President Joe Biden welcomed the annulment, stating: ‘The integrity of Romania’s elections is paramount for Romanians’ hard-earned democracy. It is the choice of the Romanian people whom they elect. No other country or foreign actor has that right.’10 By contrast, the incoming Trump administration was highly critical of the court’s decision. Vice President J.D. Vance and US billionaire and co-chair of the Department for Government Efficiency (DOGE) Elon Musk characterized the annulment as authoritarian and anti- democratic. Vance’s widely discussed Munich speech focused heavily on the annulled Romanian election as a symbol of establishment overreach.11
Interestingly, following the second round on 18 May, the Constitutional Court rejected Simion’s appeal concerning alleged election fraud and foreign interference, and formally validated the results.12 During the vote, AUR reported multiple alleged irregularities and potential instances of fraud. In addition, Telegram CEO Pavel Durov accused the French government of pressuring him to silence conservative voices on his platform before and during the election. The claim was categorically rejected by the French foreign intelligence service.13
The Romanian public also reacted with fury over what many perceived as the disregard of their democratic will. At the height of the backlash, tens of thousands of Georgescu supporters and anti-establishment protesters took to the streets of Bucharest in a series of mass demonstrations. Georgescu appealed the court’s decision but was unsuccessful, and his candidacy in the re-run was subsequently blocked.14 That brings us to the next major controversy: George Simion himself.
The Two Faces of George Simion
George Simion emerged as one of the hottest figures of the European new right during the final months of Romania’s presidential campaign. After finishing fourth in the annulled first round with 13.8 per cent of the vote, Simion and his party, AUR, wasted no time in throwing their full support behind Călin Georgescu in his battle against the court’s decision, right up until his candidacy was blocked on 11 March.15
Three days later, on 14 March, Simion officially launched his own candidacy, accompanied by former Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, who serves as president of AUR’s European political group, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR).16 The group is considered one of three conservative right-wing blocs in the European Parliament (EP), alongside Patriots for Europe (PfE)—co-founded by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán—and Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN). ECR and PfE are key allies within the EU, working together to counter mainstream progressive influence in Brussels. In addition to Morawiecki, Orbán maintains strong ties with other influential ECR leaders, including Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni.17
Simion and AUR are regarded as part of ECR’s hardline faction. He describes himself as a ‘Eurorealist’, expressing deep scepticism toward European institutions, rejecting further centralization of the Union, and advocating for the repatriation of powers to sovereign member states. He is critical of military aid to Ukraine and has been declared persona non grata in Kyiv for what officials described as ‘systematic anti-Ukrainian activities’.18 Simion also promotes strict border control, opposes EU migration policies, defends traditional Christian values, and rejects same-sex marriage.
On many of these key issues—particularly foreign policy and European integration—Simion’s views are arguably more closely aligned with PfE than with ECR. It is therefore unsurprising that several leading figures within PfE, including Marine Le Pen, Matteo Salvini, and Herbert Kickl, publicly endorsed him.19 This raises an obvious question: given the shared ideology, why are AUR and Simion aligned with ECR rather than PfE? The answer lies in the more controversial aspects of Simion’s political character.
‘For the Hungarian minority in Romania, Dan’s victory represents a clear political win’
Simion—and AUR more broadly—has a long track record of hostile rhetoric and actions towards ethnic minorities in Romania, particularly the Hungarian community, which numbers around one million people, mostly in the Transylvanian region. Before entering politics, Simion was a die-hard football ultra and co-founder of Uniți sub Tricolor (United under the Tricolour), a notorious ultra-nationalist group associated with several anti-Hungarian incidents since its establishment in 2013. Most recently, in March 2023, members of the group chanted anti-Hungarian slogans and displayed banners mocking Hungary during Romanian national football matches against Andorra and Belarus.20 That September, Simion distanced himself from the group—not due to its anti-Hungarian record, but in response to a scandal that erupted when, during a Romania–Kosovo match, members displayed banners such as ‘Kosovo is Serbia’ and chanted slogans that led to the suspension of the match.21
Simion’s rhetoric has not shifted significantly since trading his scarf for a suit. He has made numerous inflammatory remarks, including labelling the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), the country’s leading Hungarian minority party, a ‘chauvinistic creature’ and ‘ethnic terrorists’.22 Both AUR and Simion advocate for a more rigid Romanian national and cultural identity—an approach that entails the restriction of minority rights, particularly in education and the use of minority languages in administration. Simion first rose to national prominence in 2019, following a confrontation between ultranationalist Romanian activists and ethnic Hungarians at the military cemetery in Valea Uzului (Úzvölgye).23
These incidents have not gone unnoticed by the Hungarian government, which places particular emphasis on protecting Hungarian communities beyond its borders. Following last year’s European Parliament election, Fidesz parliamentary group leader Máté Kocsis explicitly stated that his party would not consider joining the ECR faction due to the presence of AUR.24
After Simion’s dominant first-round performance—in which he won 40.9 per cent of the vote—UDMR President Hunor Kelemen publicly endorsed Nicușor Dan, declaring that a Simion presidency would pose a ‘threat’ to the Hungarian minority.25
United Against Simion
In the lead-up to the run-off, George Simion made visible efforts to soften his rhetoric and appeal to the Hungarian minority—particularly after the first round, though signs of this strategy appeared earlier as well. In response to Máté Kocsis’s criticism back in 2024, Simion offered to ‘fight together against the European bureaucrats’. He had previously described himself as the ‘Romanian Viktor Orbán’ in 202126 and reportedly sought cooperation from Fidesz on several occasions.27 He even recently referred to the UDMR as a ‘serious political partner’. Additionally, during the presidential debate with Nicușor Dan, Simion mentioned Hungary in the context of defending Christianity and traditional values.
Reacting to that statement, Viktor Orbán made what many perceived as a rare political miscalculation. On 9 May, the Hungarian prime minister stated that he fully agreed with Simion on the concept of a Christian Europe founded on sovereign nation states. He added: ‘We stand on the foundation of unity and cooperation, and therefore we will not support any form of isolation or retaliation against Romania or its leadership. In the fight for sovereignty, we must be able to count on one another.’28
Taken in context, Orbán’s remarks were far from a typical endorsement. Rather, they appeared to be a pre-emptive attempt to mitigate potential negative consequences for the Hungarian minority under a possible Simion presidency by expressing openness to cooperation at the European level. Nevertheless, the statement was widely interpreted—particularly by the Hungarian opposition, international mainstream media, and Transylvanian outlets—as a clear sign of support for Simion. The backlash was swift: many within the Romanian Hungarian community, including former UDMR politicians, condemned what they viewed as an ill-advised endorsement.29
Simion sought to capitalize on Orbán’s words, using them to bolster his appeal among Hungarian voters in Romania and further reinforcing the perception that he had the Hungarian government’s backing.30 Orbán was quick to issue a clarification. The next day, in a phone call with UDMR President Hunor Kelemen, he reaffirmed that ‘in matters of national policy, the interests of the Hungarian community in Transylvania are the guiding principle’. He emphasized that the Hungarian government had no intention of interfering in the Romanian presidential election, stating that ‘Together with Romania’s current and future leaders, we are working to advance the livelihood and preservation of the Hungarian community in Transylvania’.31
Strange as it may seem, Orbán’s ambiguous remarks—and their deliberate misinterpretation by progressive and mainstream media outlets—played a significant role in George Simion’s eventual defeat. According to media reports, more than 90 per cent of Romania’s Hungarian minority voted for Nicușor Dan in the run-off. Harghita (Hargita) County, a Hungarian-majority region, emerged as the most pro-Dan area in the country, with over 90 per cent of voters backing the Bucharest mayor—compared to just 8 per cent in the first round. Other Hungarian-majority counties also turned out strongly for Dan: Covasna (Kovászna) with 84.42 per cent, and Mureș (Maros) with 67.02 per cent.32
Simion also sought to mobilize one of his key constituencies—the Romanian diaspora—but his support among them declined compared to the first round, falling from 60.79 to 55.86 per cent. In contrast, Dan secured over 44 per cent of the diaspora vote, representing a 20-percent increase—or roughly 500,000 additional votes.33
In the end, the margin between Dan and Simion was wider than most had anticipated. The Bucharest mayor won by approximately 830,000 votes—of which more than 620,000 are estimated to have come from the Hungarian minority. On the day following his victory, Dan expressed his gratitude to the community and to UDMR for their support and exemplary mobilization, which he described as going ‘almost beyond their own limits’.34
A Crisis Far from Over
Given the short time that has passed since the vote, it is difficult to draw definitive long-term conclusions about the presidential election process—from November 2024 to May 2025—and its implications for Romania’s political trajectory. One thing, however, is clear: Nicușor Dan’s victory has not resolved the structural deficiencies of the Romanian political system, nor has it restored public trust in institutions after the highly controversial annulment of the original vote. The country remains in a state of deep political crisis, underscored by a major reshaping of its party landscape.
The greatest losers—or more precisely, those responsible for the current situation—are the establishment parties: the National Liberal Party (PNL) and the Social Democratic Party (PSD). After Dan edged out their joint candidate, Crin Antonescu, in an extremely close contest in the first round, PSD Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu announced his resignation. His party subsequently withdrew from government, effectively collapsing the coalition formed by PSD, PNL, and UDMR.35
Dan’s initial statements suggest an effort to reconcile the diverse segments of the electorate. He has proposed forming a broad, pro-European coalition government comprising the PNL, PSD, UDMR, and USR.36 He has also pledged to address the socioeconomic grievances that fuelled support for AUR, stating that most of the five million Romanians who voted for Simion did so out of economic and social frustration, rather than ideological conviction. Furthermore, Dan has called for a deeper and more transparent investigation into the annulment of the November election—an explicit appeal to protest voters who supported Simion as a consequence of their disillusionment with the current political system.37
As regards foreign policy, a strongly pro-Western presidency is anticipated, in close alignment with both the EU and NATO. Continued military support for Ukraine is expected—though without the deployment of Romanian troops on Ukrainian soil—as well as backing for Kyiv’s EU accession. Dan has already begun outreach to US President Donald Trump, publicly expressing appreciation for his commitment to strengthening bilateral ties.
From a Hungarian perspective, the election results should be assessed on three levels: the EU level, the bilateral level, and in terms of the Hungarian minority in Romania. At the EU level, Dan’s victory represents a less favourable outcome for Budapest. Given his affiliation with USR and ideological alignment with Brussels on key issues, Orbán is unlikely to find in him a reliable partner for vetoing EU decisions on Ukraine, migration, or sovereignty. This dynamic was reflected in the broad wave of congratulatory messages from EU leaders and Western European governments.38
On the bilateral level, however, cooperation between Hungary and Romania has been largely constructive in recent years, and this is expected to continue under Dan’s presidency. Significant progress has been achieved in energy, the green transition, cross-border infrastructure, and cultural exchange—all areas where continuity is likely. Orbán reacted to the result in a post on X, stating that he is looking forward to working together with Dan on ‘strengthening the cooperation between Hungary and Romania’.39
For the Hungarian minority in Romania, Dan’s victory represents a clear political win—particularly given the decisive role the community played in securing it. His inclusive, pro-EU platform and his stated intention to ‘bridge hostilities’ amid the ongoing political crisis suggest that he is unlikely to pursue policies that would restrict minority rights. His proposal to include the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) in the governing coalition has further reinforced a sense of security among Hungarian voters.40
Nonetheless, some concerns persist. During the presidential debate, Dan adopted an ambiguous stance on symbols of autonomy, such as the Szekler flag, stating that it ‘should not be allowed to be used’ during official events.41 However, this position still stands in stark contrast to the openly hostile rhetoric previously expressed by AUR and George Simion up until very recently.
On 24 May, Dan once again reached out to the Hungarian community, expressing gratitude for their support. ‘I thank the Hungarian community for showing that Romania is their country’, he wrote on social media, adding in Hungarian: ‘Together we will succeed!’42
He reaffirmed that under his leadership, Romania would remain on a democratic, pro-European, and transatlantic path, guided by faith in a better future. ‘There are no saviours—we, together, will build for ourselves the country we want’, he declared, promising to do his utmost to honour the trust he had received.
NOTES
1 Joakim Scheffer, ‘Exit Polls Favour Nicușor Dan, Simion Declares Victory in Romanian Presidential Run-Off’, Hungarian Conservative (18 May 2025), www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/current/nicusor-dan-george-simion-romanian-presidential-election/.
2 Andrei Georgescu, ‘Ultimul mare sondaj înainte de turul doi al alegerilor prezidențiale de duminică, 18 mai. Avans foarte mic pentru unul dintre candidați, în marja de eroare. Suspansul continuă’, HotNews.ro (15 May 2025), https://hotnews.ro/exclusiv-ultimul-mare-sondaj-inainte-de-turul-doi-al-alegerilor-prezidentiale-de-duminica-18-mai-avans-foarte-mic-pentru-unul-dintre-candidati-in-marja-de-eroare-suspansul-continua-1976328.
3 Joakim Scheffer, ‘Hungarian Minority Delivers Victory for Nicușor Dan, Orbán Reacts’, Hungarian Conservative (19 May 2025), www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/current/nicusor-dan-hungarian-minority-viktor-orban-romania-presidential-election/.
4 John Woods, ‘More than 90% of the Hungarians Living in Romania Voted for Nicușor Dan Despite PM Orbán’s Endorsement for Anti-Hungarian George Simion’, Daily News Hungary (20 May 2025), https://dailynewshungary.com/hungarians-voted-for-nicusor-dan-orban-simion/.
5 Balázs Vencz, ‘Romania Is the Land of Promises Not of Opportunities—And It Comes at a Price’, Hungarian Conservative (2 December 2024), www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/current/romania-presidential-election-georgescu-economic-troubles-radicalism-populism-first-round-victory.
6 ‘Romania’s Top Court Annuls First Round of Presidential Vote Won by Far-Right Candidate’, AP News (6 December 2024), https://apnews.com/article/romania-election-president-georgescu-court-585e8f8f3ce7013951f5c7cf4054179b.
7 ‘Shadowy Warlord Behind Romania Election: Călin Georgescu, Far-Right Horatiu Potra, George Simion’, Politico (20 May 2025), www.politico.eu/article/shadowy-warlord-behind-romania-election-calin-georgescu-far-right-horatiu-potra-george-simion/.
8 Gabriel Elefteriu, ‘Zero Evidence: the Bogus “Intelligence” Behind Romania’s Cancelled Election’, Brussels Signal (9 January 2025), https://brusselssignal.eu/2025/01/zero-evidence-the-bogus-intelligence-behind-romanias-cancelled-election/.
9 Joakim Scheffer, ‘Inside Donald Tusk’s Hidden War against Civil Servants’, Hungarian Conservative (9 May 2025), www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/politics/donald-tusks-hidden-war-civil- servants-poland-human-rights-abuse/.
10 Matthew Miller, ‘Statement on Romanian Constitutional Court’s Ruling on Romania’s Presidential Elections’, US Department of State (6 December 2024), https://2021-2025.state.gov/statement-on-romanian-constitutional-courts-ruling- on-romanias-presidential-elections/.
11 ‘JD Vance and Elon Musk Ramp up Romanian Election Dispute’, Reuters (20 February 2025), www.reuters.com/world/europe/elon-musk-ramps-up-romanian-election-row-branding-chief-judge-tyrant-2025-02-20/.
12 ‘Romanian Top Court Rejects Challenge to Annul Presidential Election’, Reuters (22 May 2025), www.reuters.com/world/europe/romanian-top-court-rejects-challenge-annul-presidential-election-2025-05-22/.
13 Joakim Scheffer, ‘Telegram CEO Alleges French Interference in Romanian Presidential Election’, Hungarian Conservative (20 May 2025), www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/current/romania-presidential-election-telegram-interference-france-pavel-durov/.
14 Sarah Rainsford, and Laura Gozzi, ‘Final Ruling Bars Far-Right Georgescu from Romanian Vote’, BBC News (11 March 2025), www.bbc.com/news/articles/cj679nk6endo.
15 Peter Caddle, ‘Romanian Conservatives Step Down “to Support Georgescu” in Re-Run Elections’, Brussels Signal (23 January 2025), https://brusselssignal. eu/2025/01/romanian-conservatives-step-down-to-support-georgescu-in-re-run-elections/.
16 Stephen McGrath, and Vadim Ghirda, ‘Romania’s George Simion Bids for the Presidency, Seeking to Rally Far-Right Votes in Election Rerun’, AP News (14 March 2025), https://apnews.com/article/romania-election-presidency-europe-simion-07779553731c1a0d efd575f677c03343.
17 Joakim Scheffer, ‘ECR, ID and The Sovereignists—A Look at the EP Right-Wing Political Groups from a Hungarian Perspective’, Hungarian Conservative (26 June 2024), www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/politics/ecr_id_the-sovereignists_fidesz_hungary_european-elections_european-parliament_political-group_ hungary_viktor-orban/.
18 Catalina Mihai, ‘Romanian Government Publishes Reasons for Ukraine Banning Far-Right Leader’, Euractiv (18 November 2024), www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/romanian-government-publishes-reasons-for-ukraine-banning- far-right-leader/.
19 ‘Marine Le Pen și Salvini își arată susținerea pentru Simion, văzut ca un “boomerang” către Bruxelles’, Ziarul Național (5 May 2025), www.ziarulnational.md/marine-le-pen-si-salvini-isi-arata-sustinerea-pentru-simion-vazut-ca-un-bumerang-catre-bruxelles/.
20 Márton Losonczi, ‘Romanian Football Fans Demean Hungarians Again, Mock Greater Hungary Map’, Hungarian Conservative (30 March 2023), www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/current/romanian_football_fans_andorra_kosovo_anti_ hungarian_mocking_greater_hungary_map_uefa_craiova/.
21 Alex Matei, ‘Ce făcea George Simion în timp ce ultrașii Uniți sub Tricolor întrerupeau meciul România – Kosovo: “Le transmiteam prin unde”’, PlaySport.ro (13 September 2023), www.playsport.ro/ce-facea-george-simion-in-timp-ce-ultrasii-uniti-sub-tricolor-intrerupeau-meciul-romania-kosovo-le-transmiteam-prin-unde-335728.
22 ‘UDMR Satu Mare: Discursul lui George Simion instigă la ură interetnică’, Digi24 (14 May 2024), www.digi24.ro/stiri/actualitate/politica/udmr-satu-mare-discursul-lui-george-simion-instiga-la-ura-interetnica-2792269.
23 John Woods, ‘Shocking! Romanian Nationalists Attacked Hungarians Protecting a WWII Military Cemetery in Szeklerland – Photos, Videos’, Daily News Hungary (8 June 2019), https://dailynewshungary.com/shocking-romanian- nationalists-attacked-hungarians-protecting-a-wwii-military-cemetery-in-szeklerland-photos-videos/.
24 Orsolya Kuli, ‘Kocsis Máté kizártnak tartja, hogy a Fidesz egy frakcióban üljön a román AUR- ral’, Index.hu (20 June 2024), https://index.hu/kulfold/2024/06/20/kocsis-mate-fidesz-aur-ecr-europai-parlament/.
25 Viorela Marin, ‘“Depinde și de noi, maghiarii!”. Pentru UDMR, “singura prioritate” este să câștige Nicușor Dan și “ar fi o tragedie” pentru România dacă George Simion ajunge președinte’, HotNews.ro (14 May 2024), https://hotnews.ro/depinde-si-de-noi-maghiarii-pentru-udmr-singura-prioritate-este-sa-castige-nicusor-dan-si-ar-fi-o-tragedie-pentru-romania-daca-george-simion-a-1966948.
26 ‘George Simion se compară cu liderul autocrat al Ungariei: Sunt Viktor Orbán al României. Fidesz este un model pentru noi’, G4Media (20 May 2025), www.g4media.ro/george-simion-se-compara-cu-liderul-autocrat-al-ungariei-sunt-viktor-orban-al-romaniei-fidesz-este-un-model-pentru-noi.html.
27 ‘Romania Presidential Hopeful Simion’s Emissaries Reach out to Hungary’s Orbán in Search of a Pact’, Euronews (12 May 2025), www.euronews.com/2025/05/12/romania-presidential-hopeful-simions-emissaries-reach-out-to-hungarys-orban-in-search-of-a.
28 Office of the Prime Minister of Hungary, ‘Orbán Viktor beszéde a felújított Tihanyi Bencés Apátság és a Szent Kristóf Zarándokház átadó ünnepségén’ (Speech by Viktor Orbán at the Grand Opening Ceremony of the Renovated Benedictine Abbey of Tihány and the St Christopher Pilgrimage House), Miniszterelnök.hu (10 May 2025), https://miniszterelnok.hu/orban-viktor-beszede-a-felujitott-tihanyi-bences-apatsag-es-a-szent-kristof-zarandokhaz-atado-unnepsegen/.
29 ‘Romania’s Far-Right Candidate Georgescu Disqualified from Presidential Runoff’, Financial Times (20 May 2025), www.ft.com/content/541bc981-b5cf-418a-8011-f520e292b3d9.
30 István Bereznay, ‘Fokozódik a romániai kampány: George Simion Orbán Viktor mondataival házal, az RMDSZ-től azonban kemény választ kapott’ (The Romanian Campaign Intensifies: George Simion Echoes Viktor Orbán’s Words, But Receives a Harsh Response from the RMDSZ), Hirado.hu (14 May 2025), https://hirado.hu/kulfold/kulpolitika/cikk/2025/05/14/fokozodik-a-romaniai-kampany-george-simion-orban-viktor-mondataival-hazal-az-rmdsz-tol-azonban-kemeny-valaszt-kapott.
31 ‘PM Orban Consults with Hunor Kelemen’, Magyar Nemzet (11 May 2025), https://magyarnemzet.hu/english/2025/05/masolat- orban-viktor-kelemen-hunorral-egyeztetett.
32 Scheffer, ‘Hungarian Minority Delivers Victory for Nicușor Dan, Orbán Reacts’.
33 ‘Presidential Elections 2025: How Romanians Voted in the Run-off’, Romania Insider (20 May 2025), www.romania-insider.com/vote-map-simion-dan-second-round-may-2025.
34 Răzvan Adrian, ‘Kelemen Hunor: “Suntem pregătiți să construim împreună cu noul președinte ales, Nicușor Dan”’, B1TV.ro (19 May 2025), www.b1tv.ro/politica/kelemen-hunor-suntem-pregatiti-sa-construim-impreuna-cu-noul-presedinte-ales-nicusor-dan-1586525.html.
35 Stephen McGrath, ‘Romanian Premier Resigns after His Coalition’s Candidate Fails to Advance in Presidential Runoff’, AP News (5 May 2025), https://apnews.com/article/romania-prime-minister-resigns-ciolacu-37bdec8906e469dc75df0af85553878d.
36 ‘The New President of Romania Intends to Create a Coalition Government’, EADaily (19 May 2025), https://eadaily.com/en/news/2025/05/19/the-new-president-of-romania-intends-to-create-a-coalition-government.
37 ‘Romania’s New President Backs Higher NATO Spending’, Financial Times (23 May 2025), www.ft.com/content/f16a428a-f204-419c-a2fb-b39ce71f073a.
38 ‘European Leaders Congratulate Nicușor Dan on Presidential Victory’, Romania Insider (19 May 2025), www.romania-insider.com/european-leaders-congratulate-nicusor-dan-presidential-win-2025.
39 Scheffer, ‘Hungarian Minority Delivers Victory for Nicușor Dan, Orbán Reacts’.
40 ‘The New President of Romania Intends to Create a Coalition Government’.
41 ‘Both Romanian Presidential Candidates Reveal Their Ambiguous Stance on Hungarians’, Hungary Today (20 May 2025), https://hungarytoday.hu/both-romanian-presidential-candidates-reveal-their-ambiguous-stance-on-hungarians/.
42 ‘Nicușor Dan az erdélyi magyaroknak magyarul: “Együtt sikerülni fog!”’ (Nicușor Dan Addresses Transylvanian Hungarians in Hungarian: ‘Together We Will Succeed!’), Szabadság (24 May 2025), https://szabadsag.ro/article/nicusor-dan-az-erdelyi-magyaroknak-magyarul-egyutt-sikerulni-fog.
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