Sir Peter Riddell was Commissioner for Public Appointments from 2016 to 2021 and previously Director of the Institute for Government and a journalist on the Financial Times and Times for 40 years. He wrote the report on Constitutional Watchdogs for the Constitution Unit of UCL with Professor Robert Hazell, its former Director.
There is no agreement about how to maintain and regulate standards in public life. For many in the government, it is primarily a matter for the Prime Minister to supervise behaviour by ministers, and for Parliament to regulate the conduct of MPs, rather than regulators, let alone judges, both invariably described as unelected.
For Opposition parties and many commentators, self-regulation no longer works – not least in the eyes of voters. Consequently, more robust and genuinely independent oversight is needed, backed by statute.
In Constitutional Watchdogs, our new report for the Constitution Unit of UCL, Robert Hazell and I specifically address these conflicting pressures and put forward recommendations recongising ministerial prerogatives while seeking to restore public confidence in standards by strengthening the position of regulators.
There is a need to act, as recognised by cross-party bodies like the Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL) and the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee of the Commons (PACAC). There was never a golden age of ‘good chaps’ behaving well. That is a myth and self-delusion.
There have been repeated scandals under governments of both parties over recent decades. But they have reached a peak in this current Parliament. There was a widespread sense among many Conservative ministers and MPs that Boris Johnson and his allies disregarded the conventions and codes of conduct, leading to the resignation of two Independent Advisers on Ministers’ Interests and strong complaints from most of the watchdogs.
It is no longer credible to dismiss these excesses as just a one-off. They have contributed to a fall in public trust of politicians to an all-time low. Surveys for the Constitution Unit show that the public values honesty in politicians above qualities like being clever or working hard. Only 6 per cent of the public believes that politicians who fail to act with integrity are dealt with effectively.
The current constitutional watchdogs—the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments ( ACOBA), the Commissioner for Public Appointments, CSPL, the House of Lords Appointments Commission, the Independent Adviser, the Lobbyists’ Registrar and the Civil Service Commission- are, except the last two, non-statutory, subject to the whims of ministers both in their structure and operations. As the formidable Eric Pickles has often pointed out, ACOBA can huff and puff but it has no powers beyond embarrassment, which has not succeeded with Boris Johnson, and amongst other former ministers.
One answer Labour has proposed is to separate these bodies from the executive and link them more to Parliament, possibly merging a number into a new Ethics and Integrity Commission. We are sceptical about mergers. The regulators perform very distinct functions and there are advantages in a pluralistic approach with no apparent efficiency gains from bringing low-cost bodies together. Moreover, mergers are not the answer if the real problem is powers.
We recommend that these bodies be put on a statutory basis with enhanced powers to conduct and publish investigations. Â Last July, responding to the CSPL and PACAC reports, the Government rejected legislation for fear that this might involve the courts in what are essentially political matters. But this ignores the fact that these bodies in their current form are already subject to judicial review.
What matters is the definition of their roles as remaining essentially advisory, with the Prime Minister and other ministers taking the final decisions and being accountable to Parliament for them. For instance, as Commissioner for Public Appointments for five and a half years, I never appointed anyone to the board of an arms-length body. Quite rightly that was the function of ministers. My role was to oversee the process to see it was fair to all candidates ( it wasn’t always) and consistent with the Government’s own Code.
Similarly, the Prime Minister should decide about any sanction, resignation or otherwise, for a minister breaching the Ministerial Code. But neither the Prime Minister nor from bitter experience civil servants can credibly investigate whether a minister has broken the Code and whether the breach is serious. Establishing the facts- but not any punishment- has to be independent. Ministers cannot mark their own homework.
To guard against understandable fears about strengthening unelected people or bodies, the appointment and functioning of these constitutional watchdogs should be more transparent—through easily accessible websites- and accountable to the public and parliament.
A key part of our recommendations is that many changes can be introduced quickly, not least because the bodies are non-statutory. Early in a new Parliament, a Prime Minister could announce that the Independent Adviser should have the power to initiate investigations (removing the remaining residual block) and to state whether the Code has been breached.
The House of Lords Appointments Commission could be given greater powers to rule on the suitability and propriety of political appointments, and the independence of advisory interview panels on public appointments could be strengthened. None of this would interfere with ultimate ministerial responsibility.
Such immediate non-legislative actions would allow time for consultation on giving these watchdogs statutory backing and on whether to introduce an Ethics and Integrity Commission and what form it might take. Labour has suggested incorporating some of the existing regulators into the Commission, By contrast, we suggest that the present CSPL, which reviews standards issues, could develop into the new Commission with an enhanced convening role and leading the debate on standards issues. This would require greater resources- though, as now, it would not investigate specific complaints.
These changes could provide the necessary fresh start to sustain and revive public confidence that the conduct of ministers and officials is being properly monitored. But the key remains the behaviour of the Prime Minister and government and the lead they give to others. There is only so much that regulators and Codes can achieve.
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Author: Sir Peter Riddell
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